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ABSTRACT	  	   There	  is	  controversy	  over	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  billions	  of	  dollars	  given	  in	  foreign	  aid	  each	  year	  to	  developing	  countries.	  To	  remedy	  this,	  Results-­‐Based	  Financing	  (RBF),	  a	  method	  of	  giving	  money	  based	  on	  performance,	  was	  invented	  and	  has	  been	  greatly	  implemented.	  This	  study	  investigated	  whether	  RBF	  was	  used	  more	  in	  the	  Health	  sector	  than	  the	  Education	  sector	  and	  some	  of	  the	  possible	  reasons	  for	  this	  occurrence.	  A	  case	  study	  analysis	  of	  RBF	  schemes	  in	  Health	  and	  Education	  was	  conducted	  and	  complemented	  by	  literature	  and	  expert	  interviews.	  The	  findings	  show	  that	  there	  were	  more	  RBF	  schemes	  in	  Health	  than	  in	  Education.	  The	  main	  reason	  is	  the	  Education	  sector	  resisted	  measuring	  and	  tying	  incentives	  to	  educational	  outcomes	  for	  a	  longer	  period	  of	  time.	  There	  also	  seemed	  to	  be	  more	  money	  and	  human	  resources	  promoting	  RBF	  schemes	  in	  the	  Health	  than	  the	  Education	  sector.	  Lastly,	  the	  translation	  from	  outputs	  to	  outcomes	  in	  Education	  was	  much	  weaker,	  creating	  another	  limitation.	  Future	  investigation	  should	  be	  conducted	  to	  see	  if	  RBF	  will	  become	  more	  visible	  in	  Education,	  as	  most	  research	  predicts.	  More	  research	  also	  is	  needed	  to	  explain	  the	  lack	  of	  supply-­‐side	  Education	  RBF	  schemes	  in	  Latin	  America.	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INTRODUCTION:	  	  
Definition	  &	  History	  of	  Foreign	  Developmental	  Aid	  	  According	  to	  the	  Organization	  for	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development	  (OECD),	  foreign	  aid	  is	  defined	  as:	  financial	  and	  technical	  support	  along	  with	  commodities	  supplied	  as	  subsidized	  loans	  or	  grants	  for	  the	  sole	  purpose	  of	  endorsing	  economic	  development	  and	  welfare.1	  The	  concept	  of	  foreign	  aid	  is	  very	  well	  known	  and	  deemed	  an	  important	  priority	  for	  many	  governments,	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  (NGOs),	  and	  large	  foundations.	  	  Although	  seemingly	  common	  in	  today’s	  world,	  giving	  foreign	  aid	  is	  a	  somewhat	  recent	  phenomenon	  in	  history.	  	  Foreign	  developmental	  aid	  started	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  as	  more	  wealthy	  European	  countries,	  such	  as	  Britain,	  France,	  and	  Germany,	  regularly	  providing	  additional	  funds	  their	  colonies	  in	  Africa,	  the	  Americas,	  and	  Asia	  in	  order	  to	  build-­‐up	  infrastructure	  and	  the	  economy.2	  It	  was	  not	  until	  after	  World	  War	  II	  and	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  that	  other	  high-­‐income	  countries,	  such	  as	  the	  United	  States	  (US),	  started	  getting	  more	  involved	  in	  the	  development	  of	  low-­‐	  and	  middle-­‐income	  countries.	  The	  trend	  started	  in	  order	  to	  rebuild	  parts	  of	  the	  Europe	  after	  the	  war	  but	  continued	  in	  order	  to	  assist	  former	  colonies	  that	  recently	  gained	  independence	  from	  imperial	  authority.	  3	  	  It	  was	  not	  until	  the	  1960s	  that	  the	  importance	  of	  foreign	  development	  really	  started	  influencing	  countries.	  This	  was	  the	  decade	  the	  US	  founded	  the	  United	  States	  Agency	  for	  International	  Development	  (USAID),	  and	  likewise,	  other	  European	  nations	  not	  known	  for	  historically	  having	  colonies,	  such	  as	  Sweden,	  created	  similar	  aid	  programs.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Steven	  Radelet	  .	  "A	  Primer	  on	  Foreign	  Aid."	  Center	  For	  Global	  Development.	  July	  1,	  2006.	  Accessed	  March	  8,	  2	  Michael	  Seear.	  "Chapter	  2:	  A	  History	  of	  Foreign	  Aid."	  In	  An	  Introduction	  to	  International	  Health,	  Toronto:	  Canadian	  Scholars'	  Press,	  2007,	  21-­‐2.	  3	  Ibid.	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Present-­‐day	  Foreign	  Development	  &	  Its	  Importance	  	  
Business	  Growth	  Imperative	  	  
	   	  Over	  the	  past	  50	  to	  60	  years,	  the	  need	  for	  foreign	  development	  has	  been	  continuously	  recognized	  for	  many	  reasons.	  From	  an	  economic	  and	  political	  standpoint,	  assisting	  another	  country	  is	  a	  return	  on	  investment	  by	  promoting	  a	  donor	  country’s	  own	  investment	  interests	  in	  a	  developing	  market.	  Economists	  Alfred	  Maizels	  and	  Machiko	  K.	  Nissanke,	  in	  a	  regression	  analysis,	  found	  that	  donors	  were	  significantly	  influenced	  to	  fund	  developing	  countries	  where	  they	  already	  had	  substantial	  economic	  investments,	  thus	  ensuring	  more	  profitability	  on	  their	  international	  enterprises.4	  Subsequently,	  there	  was	  also	  a	  slight	  correlation	  between	  the	  amount	  of	  aid	  money	  given	  to	  developing	  countries	  and	  their	  status	  as	  a	  major	  trading	  partner	  of	  the	  donor	  country.5	  	  
Global	  Security	  Imperative	  	  
	   Along	  with	  economic	  interests,	  donor	  countries	  also	  use	  foreign	  aid	  as	  a	  way	  to	  ensure	  political	  security.	  In	  a	  study	  done	  on	  motivations	  for	  providing	  foreign	  aid,	  researchers	  found	  that	  many	  countries	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  reward	  democratization	  of	  developing	  countries	  by	  giving	  more	  aid	  money.6	  This	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  donor	  countries	  with	  strong	  democratic	  beliefs	  deem	  other	  democratic	  nations	  as	  political	  allies	  and,	  therefore,	  are	  lesser	  threats	  to	  the	  national	  security	  of	  donor	  nations.	  	  Not	  only	  do	  political	  allies	  help	  ensure	  national	  security,	  but	  alleviating	  poverty	  and	  increasing	  education	  in	  developing	  countries	  can	  also	  indirectly	  increase	  security.	  	  In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Alfred	  Maizels,	  and	  Machiko	  K.	  Nissanke.	  "Motivations	  for	  aid	  to	  developing	  countries."	  World	  
Development	  12,	  no.	  9	  (1984),	  884.	  5	  Ibid.	  6	  Alberto	  Alesina,	  and	  David	  Dollar.	  "Who	  gives	  foreign	  aid	  to	  whom	  and	  why?."Journal	  of	  economic	  growth	  5,	  no.	  1	  (2000),	  49.	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developing	  countries,	  the	  gross	  national	  product	  (GDP)	  per	  capita	  and	  secondary	  school	  enrollment	  for	  male	  citizens	  male	  are	  both	  inversely	  related	  to	  the	  likelihood	  of	  civil	  war.7	  In	  countries	  such	  as	  Afghanistan	  and	  Sudan,	  it	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  civil	  wars	  have	  created	  a	  refuge	  for	  international	  terrorists.8	  Thus,	  by	  decreasing	  civil	  wars	  in	  low-­‐income	  countries	  through	  alleviating	  poverty	  and	  increasing	  education	  donor	  countries	  can	  also	  eliminate	  spaces	  for	  international	  terrorists	  to	  gain	  strengthen	  and	  power.	  Beyond	  political	  security,	  donors	  also	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  bettering	  health	  to	  prevent	  the	  spread	  of	  diseases	  into	  their	  own	  countries.	  	  Both	  recent	  examples	  of	  the	  SARS	  and	  Ebola	  viruses	  spreading	  from	  low-­‐	  and	  middle-­‐	  income	  countries	  into	  high-­‐income	  countries	  display	  how	  fast	  deadly	  sicknesses	  can	  spread	  across	  the	  world.	  Well-­‐developed	  mechanisms	  and	  infrastructure	  to	  respond	  to	  epidemics	  are	  necessary	  to	  reduce	  the	  spread	  of	  diseases.	  By	  providing	  necessary	  funds	  for	  said	  mechanisms	  and	  infrastructure	  donor	  nations	  can	  bolster	  the	  health	  systems	  of	  developing	  countries,	  thereby	  lowering	  the	  chance	  of	  deadly	  disease	  spreading	  into	  their	  countries.	  
Moral	  Imperative	  	  	   Although	  economics	  and	  national	  self-­‐interest	  present	  reason	  for	  investing	  in	  foreign	  development,	  one	  can	  also	  argue	  there	  is	  a	  component	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  and	  a	  belief	  in	  human	  dignity	  that	  also	  play	  a	  role.	  	  According	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  database,	  the	  gross	  national	  income	  (GNI)	  per	  capita	  in	  the	  world’s	  high-­‐income	  countries	  in	  2013	  was	  $39,819.80	  USD,	  where	  as	  in	  low-­‐income	  countries	  the	  GNI	  per	  capita	  in	  2013	  was	  only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Alan	  B.	  Krueger,	  and	  Jitka	  Malečková.	  "Education,	  poverty	  and	  terrorism:	  Is	  there	  a	  causal	  connection?."	  The	  
Journal	  of	  Economic	  Perspectives	  17,	  no.	  4	  (2003),	  141.	  8	  Ibid.	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$708.80	  USD.9	  Not	  only	  is	  the	  inequality	  in	  income	  stark	  between	  countries	  across	  the	  globe,	  but	  the	  differences	  seen	  in	  health	  also	  follow	  a	  similar	  pattern.	  Compared	  to	  countries	  in	  the	  developing	  world,	  high-­‐income	  countries	  have	  a	  much	  higher	  life	  expectancy	  and	  quality	  of	  life.	  As	  of	  2013,	  people	  in	  low-­‐income	  nations	  only	  have	  an	  average	  life	  expectancy	  of	  61.6	  years	  compared	  to	  79.3	  years	  for	  those	  living	  in	  high-­‐income	  countries.10	  Unlike	  low-­‐income	  countries,	  high-­‐income	  countries	  also	  enjoy	  the	  luxury	  of	  having	  very	  low	  prevalence	  rates	  of	  many	  deadly	  communicable	  diseases.	  For	  example,	  the	  prevalence	  of	  tuberculosis	  was	  282	  per	  100,000	  people	  in	  low-­‐income	  countries	  compared	  to	  only	  22	  cases	  per	  100,000	  people	  in	  high-­‐income	  countries	  in	  2013.11	  For	  many,	  it	  is	  alarming	  to	  look	  at	  these	  statistics	  and	  even	  harder	  not	  to	  question	  the	  fairness	  in	  the	  type	  of	  life	  one	  will	  live	  decided	  by	  mere	  chance	  of	  birth	  location.	  This	  belief	  and	  line	  of	  thinking	  translates	  into	  more	  privileged	  individuals	  sharing	  some	  of	  that	  with	  others.	  On	  a	  larger	  scale,	  this	  can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  foreign	  aid	  or,	  in	  other	  words,	  nations	  with	  more	  success	  and	  opportunity	  giving	  to	  countries	  with	  fewer	  resources.	  Whether	  one	  believes	  more	  strongly	  in	  the	  economic,	  moral,	  or	  security	  reasoning	  for	  its	  existence,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  foreign	  development	  is	  important.	  The	  amount	  of	  money	  and	  resources	  invested	  in	  developing	  countries	  and	  organizations	  working	  within	  those	  countries	  each	  year	  is	  a	  testimony	  to	  the	  growing	  importance	  of	  foreign	  aid.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  "GNI	  per	  Capita,	  Atlas	  Method	  (current	  US$)."	  The	  World	  Bank.	  Accessed	  March	  9,	  2015.	  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD/countries/XM-­‐XD?display=graph.	  10	  "Life	  Expectancy	  at	  Birth,	  Total	  (years)."	  The	  World	  Bank.	  Accessed	  March	  10,	  2015.	  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN/countries/XM-­‐XD?display=graph.	  11	  "Incidence	  of	  Tuberculosis	  (per	  100,000	  People)."	  The	  World	  Bank.	  Accessed	  March	  10,	  2015.	  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.TBS.INCD/countries/XM-­‐XD?display=graph.	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  The	  Importance	  of	  Healthcare	  &	  Education	  as	  Part	  of	  Developmental	  Aid	  	  	   Seen	  in	  the	  OECD	  definition,	  the	  overall	  purpose	  of	  foreign	  development	  is	  to	  boost	  the	  economy	  of	  other	  countries.	  As	  previously	  addressed,	  many	  donor	  countries	  also	  find	  purpose	  in	  foreign	  aid	  for	  their	  own	  economic	  growth	  and	  national	  security.	  Although	  it	  may	  initially	  seem	  obvious	  that	  strengthening	  an	  economy	  and	  protecting	  invested	  interests	  means	  focusing	  on	  industry,	  job	  markets,	  and	  politics,	  there	  are	  many	  other	  intertwining	  factors	  that	  play	  a	  role.	  	  Two	  of	  the	  important	  factors	  are	  education	  and	  health.	  	  	   A	  well-­‐structured	  healthcare	  system	  is	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  any	  successful	  community,	  most	  importantly	  because	  to	  be	  in	  good	  health	  is	  a	  necessary	  requirement	  for	  any	  person	  to	  not	  only	  survive	  but	  also	  thrive.	  When	  people	  are	  sick	  they	  are	  limited	  in	  their	  capacity	  to	  keep	  a	  job,	  go	  to	  school,	  or	  take	  care	  of	  a	  family.	  Even	  if	  they	  can	  go	  to	  work	  or	  school,	  they	  will	  perform	  and	  learn	  at	  a	  lesser	  rate.	  Additionally,	  an	  economy	  and	  a	  family	  in	  a	  population	  with	  a	  shorter	  average	  life	  span	  also	  suffer	  because	  of	  declined	  human	  capital	  and	  expertise	  in	  any	  given	  field.	  Overall,	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  link	  between	  poor	  health	  and	  greater	  poverty	  within	  communities.	  On	  a	  country	  scale,	  poor	  health	  has	  also	  been	  linked	  to	  decreased	  GDP	  per	  capita.	  12	  Without	  access	  to	  healthcare	  and	  medications,	  people,	  and	  more	  so	  a	  community,	  cannot	  fully	  function,	  thus	  lowering	  economic	  and	  personal	  gains.	  	  	   There	  is	  no	  debate	  that	  education	  is	  a	  determining	  factor	  in	  the	  options	  a	  person	  has	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  global	  market.	  Education	  allows	  people	  to	  learn	  other	  languages,	  gain	  literacy,	  acquire	  essential	  mathematical	  skills,	  and	  to	  develop	  into	  more	  productive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  David	  E.	  Bloom,	  David	  Canning,	  and	  Dean	  T.	  Jamison.	  "Health,	  wealth,	  and	  welfare."	  Finance	  and	  
development	  41	  (2004),	  15.	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citizens.	  	  It	  has	  even	  been	  linked	  to	  better	  health	  and	  more	  stable	  politics	  within	  a	  country.13	  No	  matter	  the	  status	  of	  a	  country,	  it	  is	  common	  knowledge	  that	  more	  education	  is	  synonymous	  with	  more	  opportunities	  for	  advancement.	  Education	  not	  only	  helps	  individuals,	  but	  also	  benefits	  countries	  as	  a	  whole.	  A	  Harvard	  University	  economist,	  Robert	  Barro,	  found	  that	  the	  average	  years	  of	  schooling	  attained	  by	  males	  aged	  25	  and	  over	  was	  significantly	  linked	  to	  the	  economic	  growth	  rate	  in	  a	  given	  country.14	  Without	  a	  quality	  education	  system,	  people	  within	  a	  country,	  and	  thus	  the	  country	  itself,	  cannot	  sustain	  a	  highly	  sophisticated	  workforce	  and	  economy.	  	  	   Healthcare	  and	  education	  are	  not	  only	  important	  for	  people’s	  livelihood,	  the	  economy,	  and	  donor-­‐invested	  interests,	  but	  are	  also	  considered	  to	  be	  basic	  human	  rights.	  According	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  (UN),	  education	  is	  not	  only	  a	  human	  right	  but	  also	  a	  means	  in	  which	  people	  can	  realize	  other	  human	  rights.15	  The	  UN	  also	  states	  that	  it	  is	  the	  right	  of	  all	  humans	  to	  enjoy	  a	  high	  standard	  of	  both	  physical	  and	  mental	  health.16	  	  Since	  the	  UN	  is	  an	  international	  organization	  that	  is	  made	  up	  of	  many	  powerful	  countries,	  it	  can	  be	  inferred	  that	  the	  countries	  that	  have	  signed	  these	  declarations	  also	  view	  health	  and	  education	  as	  basic	  human	  rights.	  	  	   Although	  important	  for	  both	  economic	  and	  human	  rights	  reasons,	  the	  comparison	  of	  the	  quality	  and	  quantity	  of	  education	  and	  healthcare	  in	  developing	  versus	  developed	  countries	  displays	  massive	  inequalities.	  While	  the	  US	  population	  had	  a	  secondary	  school	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  "Education	  and	  the	  Developing	  World."	  Center	  For	  Global	  Development.	  June	  12,	  2006.	  Accessed	  March	  8,	  2015,	  1.	  http://www.cgdev.org/files/2844_file_EDUCATON1.pdf.	  	  14	  Robert	  J.	  Barro	  "Education	  and	  economic	  growth."	  The	  contribution	  of	  human	  and	  social	  capital	  to	  sustained	  
economic	  growth	  and	  well-­‐being	  (2001),	  30.	  15	  "Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  the	  Right	  to	  Education."	  United	  Nations	  Human	  Rights.	  Accessed	  March	  8,	  2015.	  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Education/SREducation/Pages/SREducationIndex.aspx.	  16	  "Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  the	  Right	  to	  Health."	  United	  Nations	  Human	  Rights.	  Accessed	  March	  8,	  2015.	  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Health/Pages/SRRightHealthIndex.aspx. 
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graduation	  rate	  of	  93.7%	  and	  the	  country	  had	  eradicated	  or	  had	  minimal	  cases	  of	  communicable	  diseases	  in	  2012,	  some	  developing	  countries	  were	  still	  dealing	  with	  polio	  and	  primary	  school	  completion	  rates	  of	  less	  than	  50%.17,18	  Based	  on	  this	  inequality,	  along	  with	  their	  importance,	  NGOs	  and	  governments	  alike	  continue	  to	  invest	  billons	  of	  dollars	  each	  year	  in	  the	  Education	  and	  Health	  sectors	  of	  developing	  countries.	  	  
The	  Debate	  Surrounding	  Developmental	  Aid	  and	  a	  Possible	  Remedy	  	  
	   Even	  with	  decades	  of	  NGOs	  and	  governments	  investment,	  foreign	  aid	  is	  far	  from	  perfected.	  Decades	  of	  imperfection	  have	  led	  to	  a	  constant	  debate	  over	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  foreign	  aid.	  The	  big	  question	  at	  hand	  is:	  does	  foreign	  aid	  actually	  produce	  the	  desired	  outcomes	  for	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  and	  time	  invested	  into	  it?	  	  	   Although	  evident	  that	  progress	  has	  been	  made	  in	  education	  and	  health	  around	  the	  globe,	  there	  are	  still	  millions,	  if	  not	  billions,	  of	  people	  who	  still	  do	  not	  have	  access	  to	  basic	  education,	  healthcare,	  clean	  water,	  and	  many	  other	  essentials	  necessary	  to	  survive	  and	  escape	  poverty.	  This	  leads	  many,	  if	  not	  the	  majority	  of	  people	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  and	  money	  put	  into	  developing	  countries	  thus	  far	  should	  have	  yielded	  more	  advancements	  than	  are	  currently	  observed.	  Some	  argue	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  substantial	  progress	  means	  foreign	  aid	  is,	  and	  always	  will	  be,	  an	  unsuccessful	  endeavor,	  and	  thus,	  money	  given	  to	  foreign	  countries	  should	  be	  cut	  from	  government	  budgets.	  	  However,	  others	  believe	  there	  is	  still	  significant	  importance	  in	  continuing	  to	  provide	  foreign	  aid,	  but	  believe	  the	  current	  system	  requires	  improvement	  in	  order	  to	  see	  more	  sustainable	  results.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  "School	  Enrollment,	  Secondary	  (%	  Gross)."	  The	  World	  Bank.	  January	  1,	  2012.	  Accessed	  March	  8,	  2015.	  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR/countries/1WXMZF%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20US?display=default.	  18	  "Primary	  Completion	  Rate,	  Total	  (%	  of	  Relevant	  Age	  Group)."	  The	  World	  Bank.	  January	  1,	  2012.	  Accessed	  March	  8,	  2015.	  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.CMPT.ZS/countries/1W-­‐XM?display=default.	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Since	  the	  main	  debate	  on	  foreign	  aid	  is	  about	  its	  effectiveness,	  those	  interested	  in	  changing	  the	  system	  and	  convincing	  others	  of	  foreign	  aid’s	  importance	  have	  been	  pushing	  for	  new	  methods	  that	  are	  focused	  on	  achieving	  desirable	  outcomes.	  A	  program	  that	  systematically	  measures	  and	  makes	  payments	  based	  on	  results	  would	  theoretically	  make	  aid	  more	  effective	  by	  ensuring	  achievement	  was	  linked	  to	  the	  aid.	  Such	  a	  program	  would	  also	  be	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  positive	  impact	  of	  foreign	  aid	  to	  those	  who	  are	  not	  convinced	  of	  its	  value	  or	  effectiveness.	  Through	  this	  push	  to	  focus	  on	  outcomes,	  a	  method	  of	  providing	  foreign	  aid	  called	  Result-­‐Based	  Financing	  (RBF)	  has	  been	  proposed	  and	  is	  starting	  to	  be	  implemented	  by	  aid-­‐giving	  organizations,	  especially	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom’s	  Department	  for	  International	  Development	  (DFID).	  RBF	  is	  a	  funding	  model,	  which	  instead	  of	  financing	  inputs,	  the	  traditional	  focus	  of	  funding	  structures,	  it	  focuses	  on	  outputs,	  outcomes	  or	  measurable	  goals.	  	  Thus	  far,	  RBF	  has	  been	  implemented	  in	  several	  different	  sectors	  and	  has	  promising	  preliminary	  results.	  However,	  having	  only	  been	  implemented	  within	  the	  past	  10	  to	  15	  years,	  there	  has	  not	  been	  a	  lot	  of	  cross-­‐sector	  comparison	  of	  RBF.	  Without	  this	  type	  of	  comparison,	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  to	  support	  whether	  RBF	  works	  for	  all	  sectors	  or	  if	  it	  is	  more	  effective	  in	  certain	  sectors.	  To	  further	  the	  research	  on	  RBF,	  I	  will	  be	  exploring	  a	  cross-­‐sector	  comparison	  of	  RBF’s	  uses	  in	  Education	  and	  Health	  since	  these	  two	  sectors	  are	  not	  only	  vital	  to	  development,	  but	  also	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  aid	  money	  is	  spent	  in	  these	  two	  sectors.	  
RESEARCH	  QUESTIONS:	  	  At	  first	  glance,	  it	  seemed	  that	  RBF	  is	  being	  used	  more	  in	  the	  health	  sector	  than	  in	  education.	  	  There	  was	  a	  larger	  amount	  of	  publications	  on	  RBF	  pertaining	  to	  the	  health	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sector,	  and	  the	  World	  Banks	  had	  a	  trust	  fund	  dedicated	  to	  RBF	  programs	  in	  health	  (HRITF).	  To	  more	  fully	  assess	  the	  use	  and	  capabilities	  of	  RBF	  in	  Health	  and	  Education,	  I	  ask	  the	  following	  research	  question:	  	  
• Is	  Result-­‐Based	  Financing	  (RBF)	  used	  as	  a	  funding	  mechanism	  more	  in	  international	  health	  programs	  than	  in	  international	  education	  programs?	  	  To	  answer	  this	  question,	  there	  are	  many	  aspects	  of	  the	  sectors,	  programs,	  and	  funding	  organizations	  that	  need	  to	  be	  assessed	  and	  analyzed.	  Thinking	  through	  the	  different	  factors	  that	  may	  influence	  where	  and	  how	  RBF	  is	  used,	  I	  proposed	  the	  following	  more	  specific	  research	  questions:	  
• Is	  external	  financing	  the	  main	  driver	  of	  greater	  RBF	  use?	  
• Is	  there	  more	  external	  (donor)	  money	  going	  into	  health	  over	  education?	  Is	  the	  funding	  for	  health	  and	  education	  coming	  from	  different	  sources	  (internal	  government	  funding	  v.	  international	  funding)?	  
• Are	  outputs/outcomes	  not	  as	  easily	  measured	  in	  Education	  as	  in	  Health?	  	  
o Does	  that	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  choosing	  a	  funding	  method	  to	  implement?	  
• Are	  there	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  technical	  capacity	  to	  support	  and	  help	  implement	  RBF	  in	  the	  Education	  and	  Health	  sectors?	  	  An	  essential	  component	  of	  RBF	  schemes,	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  greater	  detail	  later	  on	  is	  that	  these	  programs	  focus	  on	  rewarding	  outputs	  and	  outcomes,	  such	  as	  vaccines	  administered	  or	  children	  passing	  exams,	  instead	  of	  solely	  funding	  inputs,	  such	  as	  buildings	  and	  supplies,	  like	  most	  aid	  programs.	  	  Since	  focusing	  on	  outputs	  and	  outcomes	  is	  the	  core	  of	  RBF,	  it	  also	  seemed	  appropriate	  to	  investigate	  and	  evaluate	  the	  relationship	  between	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  and/or	  outcomes	  in	  both	  Health	  and	  Education.	  Knowing	  the	  way	  in	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which	  inputs	  translate	  into	  outputs	  and	  outcomes	  in	  each	  sector	  could	  provide	  some	  explanation	  as	  to	  why	  RBF	  is	  used	  more	  in	  one	  sector	  than	  the	  other	  if	  that	  is	  the	  case.	  Finally,	  for	  any	  new	  project	  to	  be	  implemented	  and	  successful	  it	  requires	  personnel	  with	  knowledge	  and	  experience	  to	  develop	  and	  execute	  it.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  I	  decided	  it	  was	  worthwhile	  to	  explore	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  people	  in	  both	  the	  Health	  and	  Education	  sectors	  knew	  about	  and	  had	  experience	  with	  RBF	  programs.	  	  
METHODOLOGY:	  
	   This	  research	  project	  was	  a	  qualitative	  study	  that	  focused	  on	  comparing	  the	  uses	  of	  RBF	  in	  the	  Education	  and	  Health	  sectors.	  In	  order	  to	  address	  the	  research	  questions	  posited,	  this	  study	  focused	  on	  the	  analysis	  of	  case	  studies	  of	  current	  or	  past	  RBF	  programs	  in	  the	  two	  sectors.	  The	  case	  study	  analysis	  was	  complemented	  by	  interviews	  with	  RBF	  program	  design	  experts	  in	  the	  two	  fields.	  Without	  much	  current	  research	  in	  the	  comparison	  of	  RBF	  in	  Education	  and	  Health,	  the	  goal	  of	  this	  study	  was	  to	  use	  the	  case	  studies	  supplemented	  by	  interviews	  to	  build	  a	  theory	  of	  why	  RBF	  is	  used	  the	  way	  it	  is	  in	  Education	  and	  Health.	  	  	   To	  allow	  for	  the	  case	  study	  analysis	  to	  be	  turned	  into	  a	  more	  generalizable	  theory	  that	  speaks	  for	  the	  sectors	  as	  a	  whole,	  the	  case	  studies	  were	  selected	  based	  on	  a	  set	  of	  factors.	  I	  followed	  a	  sampling	  approach	  in	  which	  I	  analyzed	  case	  studies	  in	  the	  main	  aspects	  of	  program	  design,	  financing,	  and	  evaluation	  until	  no	  significantly	  new	  information	  could	  be	  learned	  from	  the	  addition	  of	  another	  case	  study.	  	  I	  initially	  estimated	  that	  I	  would	  need	  five	  to	  six	  case	  studies	  per	  sector.	  In	  both	  sectors,	  I	  attempted	  to	  have	  case	  studies	  that	  varied	  in	  geographical	  location	  and	  were	  based	  in	  developing	  countries	  since	  this	  study	  concentrated	  on	  RBF	  schemes	  used	  as	  a	  means	  of	  providing	  foreign	  aid.	  Finally,	  as	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explained	  further	  in	  the	  Results-­‐Based	  Financing	  chapter	  below,	  the	  case	  studies	  chosen	  were	  supply-­‐side	  and	  not	  demand-­‐side	  interventions.	  	  	   Based	  on	  the	  research	  questions	  stated	  above,	  the	  case	  studies	  were	  analyzed	  systematically	  based	  on	  five	  different	  factors	  of	  the	  RBF	  program.	  These	  five	  factors	  were:	  	  
• Location	  	  
• Funding	  organization	  
• Intervention	  level	  
• Incentive	  payment	  
• Measurements	  used	  for	  incentive	  indicators.	  These	  factors	  would	  be	  seen	  in	  every	  case	  study	  and	  thus	  make	  for	  a	  strong	  comparison.	  Also,	  the	  last	  three	  factors,	  intervention	  level,	  incentive	  payment,	  and	  measurement,	  coincide	  with	  important	  components	  of	  any	  RBF	  agenda.	  Comparing	  these	  crucial	  factors	  in	  RBF	  schemes	  led	  to	  an	  inclusive	  evaluation	  of	  RBF’s	  uses	  in	  both	  sectors,	  helping	  me	  answer	  and	  build	  a	  theory	  on	  the	  main	  research	  question.	  Analyzing	  the	  RBF	  programs	  based	  on	  these	  dimensions	  is	  in	  agreement	  with	  DFID’s	  report	  that	  stated	  schemes	  should	  be	  defined	  by	  funding	  source,	  contracting	  party,	  recipient	  party,	  measurable	  goals,	  and	  payments	  linked	  to	  achieving	  said	  goals.19	  Explained	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  Results-­‐Based	  Financing	  chapter,	  RBF	  schemes	  are	  focused	  on	  outputs	  and	  outcomes	  versus	  inputs.	  In	  this	  study,	  to	  better	  analyze	  the	  cases,	  I	  made	  the	  distinction	  between	  outputs	  and	  outcomes.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  study,	  I	  defined	  inputs	  as	  materials,	  people,	  and	  infrastructure	  needed	  for	  the	  system	  or	  organization	  to	  operate.	  I	  define	  outputs	  as	  the	  direct	  services	  or	  tangible	  effects	  produced	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Mark	  Pearson,	  Martin	  Johnson,	  and	  Robin	  Ellison.	  "Review	  of	  major	  Results	  Based	  Aid	  (RBA)	  and	  Results	  Based	  Financing	  (RBF)	  schemes."	  Final	  report.	  DfID	  Human	  Development	  Resource	  Centre	  (2010),	  13.	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by	  an	  operating	  organization.	  An	  outcome	  then	  is	  the	  desired	  big-­‐picture	  result	  that	  ideally	  occurs	  because	  of	  the	  activities	  and	  actions,	  or	  outputs,	  of	  the	  organization.	  For	  example,	  in	  Education,	  an	  output	  would	  be	  high	  student	  attendance	  that	  would	  hopefully	  lead	  to	  an	  outcome	  of	  more	  learning	  achievement.	  In	  Health,	  an	  example	  would	  be	  giving	  more	  children	  vaccines	  to	  achieve	  the	  outcome	  of	  lower	  child	  mortality.	  In	  alignment	  with	  my	  definitions,	  Figure	  1	  and	  Figure	  2	  below	  classify	  elements	  as	  an	  input,	  output,	  or	  outcome	  and	  also	  depict	  the	  process	  of	  going	  from	  inputs	  to	  outcomes	  in	  both	  Health	  and	  Education.	  	  













Healthcare	  Inputs:	  -­‐Trained	  Professionals	  -­‐Medical	  supplies	  -­‐Medicines	  	  -­‐Hospitals	  &	  Clinics	  	  -­‐Transportation	  	  -­‐Money	  	  -­‐Technology	  -­‐Quality	  Standards	  
Healthcare	  
Outputs:	  -­‐Child	  Vaccinations	  -­‐Correct	  Diagnosis	  &	  Treatment	  -­‐Prenatal	  Visits	  -­‐Hospital	  Births	  -­‐Behavior	  Changes	  -­‐Care	  Quality	  -­‐Newly	  Trained	  Professionals	  -­‐Access	  to	  Care	  &	  Medication	  
Healthcare	  
Outcomes:	  -­‐Decreased	  Disease	  Incidence	  -­‐Decreased	  Disease	  	  Prevalence	  -­‐Increased	  Life	  Expectency	  	  -­‐Lower	  Morality	  Rates	  -­‐Improved	  Disability	  Adjusted	  Life	  Years	  	  -­‐Improved	  Quality	  Adjusted	  Life	  Years	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Figure	  2:	  Education	  Inputs,	  Outputs,	  and	  Outcomes	  	  
	  
	   Along	  with	  the	  case	  study	  analysis,	  interviews	  with	  subject	  matter	  experts	  from	  the	  two	   sectors	   were	   conducted.	   Five	   interviews	   were	   conducted	   in	   this	   study.	   Limited	   by	  location	  differences,	  the	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  either	  via	  email	  or	  over	  the	  phone.	  All	  who	   were	   interviewed	   were	   respected	   leaders	   in	   the	   nonprofit	   sector	   in	   the	   fields	   of	  Education	  or	  Health.	  	  There	  was	  some	  heterogeneity	  in	  the	  nature	  the	  interviewed	  experts’	  work.	  A	  few	  of	  the	  experts	  focus	  on	  measuring	  education,	  some	  work	  directly	  on	  evaluating	  RBF	  schemes	  in	  general	  or	  in	  a	  specific	  sector,	  and	  some	  worked	  more	  generally	  in	  a	  sector,	  but	   have	   had	   experiences	  with	   RBF.	   	   The	   purpose	   of	   the	   interviews	  was	   to	   gain	   further	  insight	   into	   the	  uses	  of	  RBF	   in	  each	  sector.	  Beyond	   its	  uses,	   the	   interviewees	  were	  asked	  about	  the	  potential	  reasoning	  and	  opinions	  behind	  why	  RBF	  is	  being	  used	  the	  way	  it	  is	  in	  each	  sector.	  All	  interviewees	  were	  kept	  anonymous	  in	  this	  study.	  	  
RESULTS-­‐BASED	  FINANCING	  (RBF):	  	  As	  stated	  in	  the	  Introduction	  chapter,	  RBF	  is	  the	  term	  used	  to	  describe	  all	  types	  of	  
Education	  Inputs:	  -­‐Teachers	  &	  Administration	  -­‐Classroom	  Supplies	  	  -­‐School	  Buildings	  	  -­‐Transportation	  	  -­‐Supportive	  Families	  	  -­‐Money	  	  -­‐Curriculum	  &	  Learning	  Goals	  	  -­‐Technology	  
Education	  
Outputs:	  -­‐Participation	  -­‐Apparent	  Retention	  -­‐Attendance	  -­‐Graduation	  Rates	  Completion	  	  	  -­‐Teacher	  Attendance	  	  -­‐Parent	  Satisfaction	  	  
Education	  
Outcomes:	  -­‐Standardized	  Tests	  -­‐Reading	  &	  Writing	  Literacy	  -­‐Math	  Competencies	  -­‐Estimated	  Completion	  -­‐Social	  Outcomes	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funding	  programs	  that	  pay	  on	  some	  sort	  of	  result	  instead	  of	  input.	  Although	  RBF	  has	  also	  been	  classified	  as	  Output-­‐Based	  Financing,	  or	  Payment	  for	  Performance.	  Under	  the	  RBF	  umbrella,	  however,	  there	  are	  several	  more	  specific	  types	  of	  programs	  being	  implemented.	  Some	  are	  on	  the	  demand-­‐side,	  meaning	  they	  are	  paying	  out	  to	  families	  or	  individuals	  receiving	  services	  while	  other	  programs	  pay	  to	  the	  supply-­‐side	  such	  as	  governments	  or	  organizations	  providing	  the	  services.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  study,	  I	  solely	  focused	  on	  RBF	  schemes	  that	  were	  supply-­‐side	  focused	  since	  in	  the	  Health	  and	  Education	  sectors	  the	  major	  necessary	  improvements	  needed	  are,	  arguably,	  on	  the	  supply-­‐side.	  As	  previously	  stated,	  only	  RBF	  schemes	  that	  were	  used	  as	  a	  form	  of	  foreign	  aid	  were	  studied,	  even	  though	  RBF	  schemes	  have	  also	  been	  used	  for	  domestic	  programming.	  	  The	  main	  RBF	  schemes	  used	  in	  the	  case	  studies	  analyzed	  are	  Cash	  on	  Delivery	  (COD),	  Results-­‐Based	  Aid	  (RBA),	  and	  Output-­‐Based	  Aid	  (OBA).	  COD	  is	  more	  specifically	  defined	  as	  a	  fixed	  payment	  to	  a	  recipient	  government	  “for	  each	  additional	  unit	  of	  progress	  toward	  a	  common	  agreed	  goal”.20	  RBA	  can	  be	  defined	  similarly	  but	  differs	  in	  that	  it	  still	  utilizes	  the	  traditional	  aid	  relationship	  meaning	  both	  the	  funder	  and	  recipient	  are	  governments.21	  OBA	  is	  also	  similar,	  but	  is	  paid	  out	  to	  a	  firm,	  such	  as	  an	  NGO,	  and	  is	  more	  broadly	  described	  as	  payments	  linked	  to	  the	  delivery	  of	  indicated	  services	  or	  outputs.22	  Other	  RBF	  programs	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  studies	  also	  pay	  on	  performance	  but	  reward	  recipients	  with	  gifts	  instead	  of	  monetary	  awards.	  The	  details	  of	  RBF	  described	  below	  hold	  true	  for	  supply-­‐side	  programs,	  but	  not	  always	  for	  demand-­‐side	  RBF	  programs.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Rita	  Perakis,	  and	  William	  D.	  Savedoff.	  "An	  Introduction	  to	  Cash	  on	  Delivery	  Aid	  for	  Funders."	  Note.	  
Washington,	  DC:	  CGD	  (2014),	  1.	  21	  Rita	  Perakis,	  and	  William	  Savedoff.	  "Does	  Results-­‐Based	  Aid	  Change	  Anything?	  Pecuniary	  Interests,	  Attention,	  Accountability	  and	  Discretion	  in	  Four	  Case	  Studies."	  (2015),	  2.	  22	  "What	  Is	  OBA."	  GPOBA.	  Accessed	  March	  11,	  2015.	  https://www.gpoba.org/what-­‐is-­‐oba.	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A	  RBF	  program	  begins	  with	  a	  contract	  agreed	  upon	  by	  both	  the	  giving	  and	  receiving	  party.	  In	  this	  contract,	  there	  has	  to	  be	  established	  measurable	  indicators	  that	  are	  outputs	  or	  outcomes,	  not	  inputs.	  The	  contract	  must	  state	  in	  which	  ways	  indicators	  will	  be	  measured.	  Usually	  the	  recipient	  government	  or	  organization	  will	  do	  the	  measuring	  and	  reporting,	  but	  in	  almost	  all	  RBF	  programs	  an	  independent	  party	  is	  also	  used	  to	  verify	  reported	  results.	  Finally,	  the	  contract	  must	  state	  the	  expected	  results	  and	  what	  the	  payment	  will	  be	  if	  the	  said	  results	  are	  in	  fact	  accomplished.	  	  	  Something	  RBF	  contracts	  usually	  do	  not	  state	  is	  how	  the	  results	  are	  going	  to	  be	  achieved.	  RBF,	  in	  many	  of	  its	  sub-­‐categories,	  is	  considered	  a	  “hands-­‐off”	  approach	  to	  funding,	  which	  allows	  the	  recipients	  the	  freedom	  to	  create	  programs	  they	  feel	  will	  be	  most	  appropriate	  to	  improve	  the	  system.23	  	  Ideally,	  this	  will	  negate	  some	  of	  the	  inefficiencies	  brought	  upon	  by	  funders	  deciding	  how	  the	  money	  will	  be	  used	  when	  they	  are	  not	  as	  familiar	  with	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  population	  as	  locals	  are.	  Moreover,	  this	  approach	  also	  allows	  for	  recipients	  to	  be	  less	  dependent	  on	  donors.	  	  Another	  hope	  is	  that	  RBF	  programs	  will	  increase	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  of	  the	  recipient.	  The	  expectation	  is	  that	  both	  the	  agreed	  upon	  contract	  and	  the	  results	  of	  the	  measurements	  taken	  are	  published	  for	  the	  public	  to	  see.	  This	  makes	  the	  recipient	  not	  only	  accountable	  to	  the	  funder,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  population	  it	  is	  serving.	  This	  allows	  the	  population	  to	  know	  when	  their	  government	  is	  not	  delivering	  what	  they	  have	  promised	  and	  to	  potentially	  give	  feedback	  on	  which	  programs	  work	  and	  which	  do	  not.	  Ultimately,	  this	  more	  intentional	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  will	  expectantly	  decrease	  corruption	  and	  the	  misuse	  of	  funds.	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  Perakis	  and	  Savedoff.	  "An	  Introduction	  to	  Cash	  on	  Delivery	  Aid	  for	  Funders,”	  1.	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Although	  an	  alternative	  to	  traditional	  funding	  of	  foreign	  development,	  RBF	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  standalone	  funding	  model.	  It	  is	  usually	  a	  supplementary	  aid	  program,	  as	  the	  money	  for	  inputs	  is	  still	  a	  necessity	  in	  most	  cases.	  The	  hope	  is	  that	  in	  accompanying	  the	  traditional	  input-­‐based	  aid	  the	  recipient	  governments	  or	  organizations	  will	  be	  motivated	  to	  use	  the	  inputs	  more	  efficiently	  and,	  in	  return,	  be	  able	  to	  see	  clearer	  results	  from	  the	  aid	  money	  received.	  	  
LITERATURE	  REVIEW:	  	  
Results-­‐Based	  Initiatives	  	  
	   	  Results-­‐based	  incentives,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  foreign	  development,	  started	  evolving	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  several	  other	  bilateral	  aid	  agencies	  in	  response	  to	  critics	  of	  the	  current	  foreign	  aid	  policies.	  Their	  ideas	  were	  based	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  for	  an	  aid	  program	  to	  be	  successful,	  funders	  should	  require	  recipients	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  consultations,	  planning	  seminars,	  and	  meetings	  with	  NGOs,	  local	  communities,	  and	  domestic	  interest	  groups,	  but	  that	  ultimately	  recipient	  countries	  should	  take	  ownership	  of	  program	  design	  and	  implementation.24	  Continuing	  in	  this	  direction,	  the	  Paris	  Declaration	  was	  written	  and	  signed	  by	  over	  90	  countries	  and	  aid	  organizations	  in	  2005	  with	  the	  commitment	  of	  funders	  to	  help	  reform	  aid	  to	  focus	  on:	  	  •	  Increasing	  the	  recipient’s	  ownership	  of	  aid-­‐	  funded	  programs	  •	  Promoting	  coordination	  between	  funding	  organizations	  on	  the	  design,	  implementation,	  and	  reporting	  of	  foreign	  developmental	  initiatives	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Nancy	  Birdsall,	  William	  D.	  Savedoff,	  Ayah	  Mahgoub,	  and	  Katherine	  Vyborny.Cash	  on	  delivery:	  a	  new	  
approach	  to	  foreign	  aid.	  CGD	  Books,	  2010,	  6. 
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•	  Creating	  objectives	  for	  programs	  that	  are	  in	  accordance	  with	  recipient’s	  own	  priorities	  and	  current	  systems.	  	  •	  Using	  performance	  and	  results	  as	  measures	  of	  achievement	  •	  Increasing	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  foreign	  aid	  by	  promoting	  accountability	  of	  both	  donors	  and	  recipients	  •	  Allowing	  recipient	  governments	  or	  organizations	  gain	  more	  autonomy	  by	  helping	  them	  better	  plan	  and	  manage	  their	  own	  budgets.25	  With	  these	  principals	  as	  building	  blocks,	  researchers	  and	  other	  development	  experts	  have	  begun	  to	  build	  RBF	  programs	  to	  be	  used	  for	  current	  and	  future	  foreign	  aid	  initiatives.	  Several	  different	  approaches	  to	  results-­‐based	  programming	  in	  foreign	  development	  have	  since	  been	  implemented	  and	  studied	  for	  effectiveness.	  	  Some	  of	  the	  more	  common	  RBF	  schemes	  are	  COD,	  RBA,	  Conditional	  Cash	  Transfers	  (CCT),	  Output-­‐Based	  Aid	  (OBA),	  Performance-­‐Based	  Financing	  (PBF),	  and	  prizes	  for	  high	  yields.	  Each	  program	  type	  differs	  slightly	  in	  intervention	  focus,	  payment	  structures,	  and	  overall	  objectives.	  COD	  and	  RBA	  programs	  have	  focused	  objectives	  and	  try	  to	  incentivize	  governments.	  CCT	  agendas	  also	  have	  very	  focused	  objectives	  but	  aim	  to	  incentivize	  families	  by	  supplementing	  income	  only	  if	  certain	  services,	  such	  as	  healthcare,	  are	  sought	  out.	  OBA	  programs	  have	  few	  objectives	  and	  are	  focused	  on	  incentivizing	  firms	  to	  achieve	  outputs.	  PBF	  schemes	  can	  have	  multiple	  objectives	  and	  are	  focused	  on	  disbursing	  payments	  to	  facilities,	  like	  health	  clinics.	  26	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  BIrdsall,	  Savedoff,	  Mahgoub,	  and	  Vyborny.Cash	  on	  delivery:	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  foreign	  aid,	  8.	  	  	  26	  William	  D.	  Savedoff	  "Incentive	  proliferation?	  Making	  sense	  of	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  development	  programs."	  (2011),	  13-­‐14.	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Since	  its	  implementation,	  debate	  over	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  RBF	  has	  been	  prevalent.	  Although	  a	  promising	  initiative	  to	  make	  aid	  more	  efficient,	  there	  are	  still	  potential	  downfalls	  to	  RBF.	  First,	  evidence	  from	  previous	  schemes	  has	  revealed	  agreeing	  upon	  appropriate	  indicators	  and	  payments	  that	  actually	  incentivize	  providers	  are	  difficult	  tasks.27	  	  Other	  concerns	  are	  that	  focusing	  on	  certain	  targets	  through	  RBF	  schemes	  could	  lead	  recipient	  countries	  or	  organizations	  to	  distort	  resource	  allocation	  away	  from	  other	  important	  initiatives.	  Furthermore,	  RBF	  could	  mean	  shifting	  aid	  away	  from	  low-­‐preforming	  countries,	  even	  when	  they	  still	  need	  substantial	  aid.28	  	  There	  is	  also	  the	  possibility	  that	  RBF	  may	  be	  less	  effective	  in	  low-­‐income	  than	  in	  high-­‐income	  countries.	  In	  a	  systematic	  review	  comparing	  RBF	  use	  in	  high-­‐income	  and	  low-­‐income	  countries,	  researchers	  concluded	  that	  RBF	  might	  create	  more	  undesirable	  effects	  and	  have	  more	  implementation	  limitations	  in	  low-­‐income	  countries.	  These	  undesirable	  effects	  could	  be:	  corruption,	  increasing	  the	  wealth	  gap,	  dependency	  on	  incentives,	  bureaucratization,	  and	  dilution	  of	  professional	  intrinsic	  motivation.	  29	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  many	  researchers	  have	  published	  studies	  supporting	  RBF’s	  success	  thus	  far.	  Many	  programs	  have	  shown	  that	  RBF	  incentives	  were	  successful	  in	  achieving	  better	  outputs	  and	  outcomes.	  RBF	  programs	  monitoring	  child	  growth,	  significant	  decreases	  in	  stunting	  were	  seen	  in	  Mexico,	  Nicaragua,	  and	  Colombia	  by	  29%,	  5.5%,	  and	  6.9%	  respectively.30	  	  Further	  investigations	  have	  supported	  that	  RBF	  programs	  in	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  Amanda	  Melina	  Grittner.	  "Results-­‐based	  Financing."	  Bonn,	  Germany:	  	  German	  Development	  Institute	  (2013),	  24.	  28	  Paolo	  De	  Renzio,	  and	  Nagaire	  Woods.	  "The	  Trouble	  with	  Cash	  on	  Delivery	  Aid:	  A	  note	  on	  its	  potential	  effects	  on	  recipient	  country	  institutions."	  Note	  prepared	  for	  CGD	  initiative	  on	  cash	  on	  delivery	  (2008),	  2.	  29	  Andy	  D.	  Oxman,	  and	  Atle	  Fretheim.	  "An	  overview	  of	  research	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  results-­‐based	  financing."	  (2008),	  4.	  30	  Rena	  Eichler,	  and	  Ruth	  Levine,	  eds.	  Performance	  incentives	  for	  global	  health:	  potential	  and	  pitfalls.	  CGD	  Books,	  2009,	  30.	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Bangladesh	  and	  Cambodia	  successfully	  achieved	  targets	  to	  improve	  access	  to	  healthcare	  and	  reduce	  household	  spending	  on	  healthcare.	  31	  All	  of	  these	  examples	  point	  to	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  incentivized	  schemes.	  	  In	  response	  to	  claims	  of	  possible	  drawbacks,	  analysis	  of	  an	  RBF	  scheme	  in	  Cambodia	  concluded	  that	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  supporting	  this	  program	  caused	  aversive	  effects	  or	  neglect	  of	  non-­‐incentivized	  services.32	  Addressing	  other	  concerns,	  some	  analyzes	  of	  RBF	  schemes	  have	  also	  shown	  that	  it	  is	  a	  cost-­‐effective	  foreign	  aid	  mechanism.	  In	  Bangladesh,	  the	  performance-­‐based	  contracted	  NGOs	  outperformed	  the	  public	  sector	  firms	  in	  delivering	  healthcare	  services	  while	  also	  being	  paid	  a	  comparable	  amount	  to	  those	  public	  firms.33	  Despite	  the	  evidence	  supporting	  both	  sides,	  many	  researchers	  have	  commented	  on	  the	  lack	  of	  rigorous	  studies	  of	  RBF	  effectiveness	  in	  achieving	  targeted	  outcomes,	  making	  the	  evidence	  for	  its	  success	  weak.34	  Additionally,	  more	  research	  needs	  to	  be	  done	  on	  the	  sustainability	  and	  cost-­‐effectiveness	  of	  RBF.35	  This	  is	  most	  likely	  due	  to	  its	  relative	  newness	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  foreign	  aid.	  	  
Educational	  Results-­‐Based	  Programs	  	  
	   RBF	  experts	  have	  also	  made	  the	  argument	  for	  its	  use	  in	  Education	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  primary	  and	  secondary	  schooling	  around	  the	  world.	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  fundamental	  criteria	  for	  an	  RBF	  scheme	  is	  that	  the	  objectives	  agreed	  upon	  are	  important	  to	  both	  parties,	  and	  for	  Education	  that	  is	  seemingly	  simple.	  In	  2000,	  the	  Millennium	  Development	  Goals	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  Grittner.	  "Results-­‐based	  Financing.",	  23.	  32	  Ibid,	  32.	  	  33	  Ibid,	  40.	  34	  Andrew	  D.	  Oxman,	  and	  Atle	  Fretheim.	  "Can	  paying	  for	  results	  help	  to	  achieve	  the	  Millennium	  Development	  Goals?	  Overview	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  results-­‐based	  financing."	  Journal	  of	  Evidence-­‐Based	  Medicine	  2,	  no.	  2	  (2009),	  78. 35	  Oxman	  and	  Fretheim.	  "An	  overview	  of	  research	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  results-­‐based	  financing."	  (2008),	  4.	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(MDGs)	  were	  created	  as	  a	  UN	  declaration	  and	  were	  agreed	  upon	  by	  189	  countries.36	  One	  of	  the	  MDGs	  was	  the	  universalization	  of	  primary	  schooling	  by	  2015;	  however,	  it	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  accomplished.	  According	  to	  COD	  experts	  Nancy	  Birdsall	  and	  William	  Savedoff,	  COD,	  and	  more	  broadly	  RBF	  schemes,	  may	  be	  the	  way	  to	  reestablish	  motivation	  among	  donors	  and	  recipients	  and	  accelerate	  progress	  in	  countries	  where	  universal	  primary	  education	  has	  not	  been	  achieved.37	  	  	   With	  such	  large	  goals	  in	  Education	  of	  achieving	  universal	  primary	  education	  and	  also	  wanting	  to	  increase	  secondary	  education,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  become	  discouraged	  by	  the	  vastness	  of	  the	  task.	  By	  focusing	  on	  and	  incentivizing	  attainable,	  smaller	  targets,	  RBF	  can	  help	  remedy	  this	  issue	  while	  still	  working	  towards	  the	  larger	  end-­‐goal.38	  This	  type	  of	  aid	  can	  potentially	  give	  more	  motivation	  and	  encouragement	  to	  developing	  countries	  that	  still	  lack	  the	  educational	  systems	  needed	  to	  achieve	  universal	  schooling	  for	  its	  children.	  	  RBF	  can	  also	  help	  Education	  focus	  more	  on	  its	  quality	  versus	  just	  its	  quantity.	  Experts	  suggest	  that	  completion	  of	  primary	  school	  should	  be	  measured	  by	  the	  number	  of	  students	  who	  complete	  a	  standardized	  test,	  or	  another	  learning	  assessment,	  in	  their	  last	  year	  of	  primary	  school	  because	  it	  is:	  	  •	  An	  easily	  defined	  measurement	  	  •	  Closely	  related	  to	  MDG	  goals	  for	  universal	  education	  	  	  •	  Focused	  on	  the	  achievement	  and	  quality	  of	  learning	  	  •	  Easy	  to	  audit	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  Birdsall,	  Savedoff,	  Mahgoub,	  and	  Vyborny.Cash	  on	  delivery:	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  to	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  aid.,	  46	  37	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  Savedoff,	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  to	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  38	  Katherine	  Vyborny.	  "Cash	  on	  delivery	  aid	  for	  education:	  experiences	  of	  incentive-­‐based	  approaches."	  Center	  
for	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  Available	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  cgdev.	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  (2007),	  1.	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•	  A	  way	  to	  encourage	  the	  development	  of	  suitable	  testing	  systems	  and	  methods	  of	  reporting	  information.39	  Using	  learning	  assessments	  as	  a	  measure	  helps	  set	  a	  standard	  for	  the	  definition	  of	  school	  completion	  that	  can	  vary	  across	  countries.	  Testing	  can	  also	  be	  an	  easier	  and	  better	  way	  of	  assessing	  progress	  since	  attendance	  and	  other	  types	  of	  records	  can	  be	  poorly	  kept	  or	  falsified	  by	  recipient	  nations.	  Also,	  by	  measuring	  a	  student	  who	  passes	  the	  test,	  instead	  of	  those	  who	  merely	  take	  it,	  helps	  determine	  the	  quality	  of	  education	  given	  to	  students.40	  
Health	  Results-­‐Based	  Programs	  	  
	   Much	  like	  in	  Education,	  many	  common	  goals	  to	  improve	  the	  Health	  sector	  internationally	  have	  been	  instated.	  	  Three	  of	  the	  MDGs	  are	  directly	  related	  to	  improving	  health,	  more	  specifically	  enhancing	  maternal	  and	  child	  health	  and	  decreasing	  the	  rate	  of	  common	  diseases,	  such	  as	  malaria	  and	  HIV/AIDS.41	  Thus,	  RBF	  schemes	  can	  be	  effective	  in	  Health	  because	  of	  their	  emphasis	  on	  shared	  objectives	  between	  donor	  and	  recipients.	  RBF	  schemes	  in	  Health	  also	  help	  people	  who	  cannot	  afford	  healthcare	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  care.	  It	  also	  benefits	  donors,	  as	  they	  no	  longer	  have	  to	  micromanage	  finances	  for	  programs	  going	  on	  in	  other	  countries.	  42	  In	  Health,	  there	  is	  also	  the	  possibility	  that	  RBF	  schemes,	  with	  their	  broad	  outcome	  indicators,	  can	  promote	  policy	  changed	  to	  strengthen	  health	  systems	  in	  developing	  countries.	  43	  Incentives	  based	  on	  the	  additional	  efforts	  of	  the	  recipient	  can	  help	  improve	  health	  development	  by	  assisting	  recipients	  in	  paying	  for	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  additional	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  William	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  Savedoff,	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  Katherine	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  "Cash	  on	  delivery	  aid	  for	  health:	  What	  indicators	  would	  work	  best?."	  Center	  for	  Global	  Development	  Working	  Paper	  275	  (2011),	  2.	  42	  Eichler,	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  20.	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associated	  with	  caring	  for	  more	  people	  and	  are	  overall	  a	  stronger	  motivation	  to	  progress	  healthcare.44	  RBF	  schemes	  also	  can	  foster	  the	  enhancement	  of	  logistical	  structures	  within	  healthcare	  in	  order	  to	  guarantee	  the	  long-­‐term	  sustainability	  of	  the	  system.45	  	  Although	  there	  is	  much	  literature	  on	  RBF,	  researchers	  have	  clearly	  identified	  some	  current	  research	  gaps	  and	  call	  for	  more	  in	  order	  to	  better	  assess	  whether	  it	  is	  an	  effective	  foreign	  aid	  mechanism.46	  Still,	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  of	  its	  effectiveness,	  however,	  almost	  all	  that	  examination	  is	  focused	  on	  Health	  RBF	  schemes.	  Even	  so,	  many	  have	  advocated	  its	  use	  in	  Education	  and,	  in	  more	  recent	  years,	  have	  begun	  a	  more	  rigorous	  implementation	  of	  it	  in	  Education.	  	  Furthermore,	  there	  is	  even	  less	  investigation	  on	  the	  comparison	  of	  RBF’s	  uses	  in	  these	  two	  sectors.	  This	  study	  hopes	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  cross-­‐sector	  comparison	  of	  RBF’s	  uses	  in	  order	  to	  create	  more	  understanding	  of	  how	  RBF	  can	  be	  used	  more	  effectively,	  especially	  in	  Education,	  and	  help	  demonstrate	  the	  current	  state	  of	  RBF	  in	  both	  sectors.	  Understanding	  these	  components	  will	  allow	  for	  continued	  learning	  of	  implementing	  RBF	  in	  two	  very	  unique	  sectors,	  and	  will	  especially	  highlight	  the	  potential	  differences	  in	  RBF	  schemes	  across	  sectors.	  	  
OBSERVATIONS:	  	  
RBF	  Case	  Studies	  in	  Education	  	  Below,	  Table	  1	  presents	  and	  summarizes	  the	  five	  RBF	  Education	  case	  studies	  based	  on	  the	  five	  main	  points	  of	  comparison	  described	  in	  the	  Methodology	  chapter.	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Table	  1:	  Education	  Case	  Study	  Comparison	  




Twaweza	  (DFID,	  World	  Bank,	  &	  SIDA)	  
DFID	  	   DFID	   Azim	  Premji	  Foundation	  (World	  Bank	  &	  Educational	  Initiatives)	  
International	  Child	  Support	  (Dutch	  NGO)	  
Level	  of	  
Intervention	  
Teacher,	  School,	  District,	  or	  Community	  Level	  (RCT)	  
National	  Governmental	  Level	  (Ministry	  of	  Ed.)	  
National	  Government	  level	  (Ministry	  of	  Ed.)	  
Teacher	  or	  School	  Level	  (RCT)	   Teacher	  Level	  
Incentive	  
Payment	  	  
20	  USD	  per	  pupil	   150	  pounds	  per	  additional	  primary	  completers.	  250	  pounds	  per	  additional	  S3	  completer	  from	  previous	  year	  
75	  USD	  per	  boy	  pupil	  100	  USD	  per	  girl	  pupil	  (&	  paid	  if	  more	  than	  baseline	  took	  exam)	  
Increasing	  bonus	  based	  on	  average	  class	  or	  school	  exam	  score	  >5%	  of	  baseline	  
Prize-­‐	  based	  bonus	  (enough	  prizes	  for	  about	  half	  the	  schools	  to	  win)	  
Measurement	  
Used	  
Uwezo	  Grade	  2	  Literacy	  &	  Numeracy	  Exam	  
Increased	  number	  of	  children	  that	  complete	  P6,	  S3	  &	  S6	  (&	  teacher’s	  English	  competency)	  
National	  Grade	  10	  Examination	  	   Grade	  3-­‐5	  Math	  &	  Language	  Exam	  	  
School	  average	  of	  district	  exams	  (Grade	  4-­‐8)	  	  
Twaweza	  Case	  Study	  In	  more	  detail,	  Twaweza,	  an	  NGO	  working	  primarily	  in	  Tanzania,	  is	  implementing	  the	  first	  Education	  case	  study	  I	  analyzed.	  The	  program	  is	  also	  being	  supported	  by	  several	  large	  financial	  backers:	  DFID,	  the	  World	  Bank,	  and	  the	  Swedish	  International	  Development	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  better	  and	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  local	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  on	  delivery."	  Note.	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  (2012),	  2-­‐8.	  48	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  2011/12	  to	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  Case.”	  England:	  UKaid	  from	  the	  Development	  for	  International	  Development,	  45.	  	  49	  Nancy	  Birdsall	  and	  Rita	  Perakis.“Cash	  on	  Delivery	  Aid:	  Implementation	  of	  a	  Pilot	  in	  Ethiopia.”Note.	  Washington,	  DC:	  CGD	  (2012),	  2-­‐6.	  	  50	  Karthik	  Muralidharan	  and	  Venkatesh	  Sundararaman.	  Teacher	  performance	  pay:	  Experimental	  evidence	  from	  
India.	  No.	  w15323.	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  Research,	  2009,	  43-­‐52.	  51	  Glewwe,	  Paul,	  Nauman	  Ilias,	  and	  Michael	  Kremer.	  Teacher	  incentives.	  No.	  w9671.	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  Research,	  2003,	  207-­‐209.	  Accessed	  March	  9,	  2015.	  https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.2.3.205.	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Cooperation.	  The	  program	  was	  finalized	  in	  2012,	  but	  started	  its	  implementation	  in	  2013	  and	  is	  still	  in	  progress.	  The	  program	  is	  being	  executed	  as	  a	  randomized	  control	  trial	  in	  order	  to	  test	  different	  combinations	  of	  interventions	  to	  better	  assess	  how	  RBF	  can	  be	  best	  implemented	  in	  Tanzania.	  	  This	  program	  is	  testing	  three	  different	  interventions.	  	  The	  first	  intervention	  contains	  no	  RBF	  features	  but	  is	  assessing	  the	  impact	  of	  disbursing	  the	  normal	  $10USD/	  pupil	  funds	  to	  either	  districts	  or	  schools	  based	  on	  the	  literacy	  and	  numeracy	  test	  scores	  of	  their	  students.	  The	  second	  intervention	  is	  a	  COD-­‐type	  scheme	  but	  differs	  slightly	  in	  that	  it	  does	  not	  pay	  out	  to	  government	  only.	  For	  every	  student	  that	  passes	  a	  Grade	  2	  literacy	  and	  numeracy	  assessment	  constructed	  by	  Uwezo,	  a	  branch	  of	  Twaweza,	  $20USD/pupil	  is	  disbursed.	  This	  COD-­‐type	  attempt	  will	  be	  focused	  at	  a	  local	  government	  level	  and	  will	  include	  four	  different	  models	  of	  disbursement.	  One	  trial	  will	  give	  the	  money	  to	  the	  districts	  and	  another	  directly	  to	  the	  schools,	  the	  third	  to	  the	  teachers,	  and	  the	  fourth	  will	  split	  the	  $20	  USD/pupil	  between	  the	  teacher	  and	  the	  student’s	  parents.	  	  This	  is	  being	  done	  to	  assess	  the	  level	  at	  which	  the	  incentive	  produces	  the	  best	  results.	  The	  third	  intervention	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  combination	  of	  a	  COD-­‐	  type	  scheme	  and	  traditional	  input-­‐based	  aid.	  In	  this	  intervention,	  each	  school	  will	  receive	  $10USD/pupil	  upfront.	  In	  addition,	  for	  each	  student	  who	  passes	  the	  Uwezo	  Grade	  2	  literacy	  and	  numeracy	  assessments	  the	  school	  or	  the	  teachers	  and	  parents,	  depending	  on	  the	  trial,	  will	  be	  awarded	  an	  extra	  $20USD/pupil.	  Twaweza	  also	  states	  that	  to	  verify	  these	  results,	  independent	  experts	  were	  used	  to	  further	  ensure	  the	  validity	  and	  reliability	  of	  the	  documented	  results.	  52	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DFID	  Case	  Studies	  	   Following	  that	  study,	  I	  analyzed	  two	  case	  studies	  on	  programs	  being	  implemented	  and	  funded	  by	  DFID	  in	  Ethiopia	  and	  Rwanda.	  Both	  are	  RBA	  programs	  and	  deal	  directly	  with	  the	  national	  governments	  of	  Ethiopia	  and	  Rwanda,	  specifically	  the	  National	  Ministries	  of	  Education.	  The	  programs	  were	  drafted	  and	  implemented	  in	  2011-­‐2012	  and	  continuing	  until	  the	  end	  of	  2015,	  with	  the	  potential	  of	  renewing	  the	  contracts.	  The	  United	  Kingdom,	  through	  DFID,	  has	  been	  in	  an	  aid-­‐giving	  relationship	  with	  these	  countries	  long	  before	  these	  programs	  and	  continues	  to	  also	  give	  traditional	  aid	  in	  addition	  to	  these	  new	  RBF	  schemes.	  DFID	  also	  indicated	  that	  for	  both	  of	  their	  programs,	  a	  hired	  independent	  agent	  is	  performing	  random	  sampling	  and	  verification	  of	  reported	  results.	  	  	   In	  Rwanda,	  DFID	  implemented	  a	  program	  that	  focuses	  on	  both	  primary	  and	  secondary	  school	  success.	  The	  indicators	  are	  solely	  outcome-­‐based,	  paying	  on	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  P6,	  the	  final	  primary	  school	  exam,	  and	  the	  S3,	  a	  secondary	  school	  exam.	  For	  each	  additional	  student	  from	  the	  previous	  year	  that	  passes	  the	  P6	  exam,	  DFID	  gives	  the	  Rwandan	  government	  £150/pupil.	  For	  each	  additional	  student	  from	  the	  previous	  year	  that	  passes	  the	  S3	  exam,	  DFID	  awards	  the	  government	  £250/pupil.53	  
	   In	  Ethiopia,	  DFID	  has	  designed	  a	  program	  that	  is	  a	  mixture	  of	  output	  and	  outcome	  indicators	  on	  which	  they	  give	  payment	  disbursements.	  The	  output	  measure	  focuses	  on	  secondary	  school	  enrollment	  and	  the	  outcome	  measure	  focuses	  on	  passing	  a	  critical	  secondary	  exam.	  First,	  they	  will	  give	  a	  disbursement	  for	  every	  additional	  student	  from	  the	  previous	  year	  that	  sits	  in	  on	  the	  already-­‐existing	  Ethiopian	  grade	  10	  standardized	  test.	  In	  regions	  of	  Ethiopia	  that	  are	  considered	  emerging,	  or	  less	  developed,	  DFID	  pays	  £75/boy	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  45.	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and	  £100/	  girl	  taking	  the	  grade	  10	  exam.	  In	  non-­‐emerging	  regions,	  they	  will	  pay	  £50/boy	  and	  £85/girl	  taking	  the	  test.	  For	  the	  second	  indicator,	  DFID	  pays	  the	  government	  for	  each	  additional	  student	  that	  passes	  the	  grade	  10	  exam	  from	  the	  previous	  year.	  In	  emerging	  regions,	  they	  pay	  £75/boy	  and	  £100/girl,	  while	  in	  non-­‐emerging	  regions	  they	  pay	  £50/boy	  and	  £85/girl.	  	  In	  Ethiopia,	  unlike	  Rwanda,	  DFID	  found	  that	  girls	  were	  less	  present	  in	  school	  and	  performing	  worse	  than	  boys.	  	  This	  led	  to	  DFID	  to	  pay	  more	  for	  the	  schooling	  of	  girls	  in	  hopes	  to	  incentive	  the	  education	  of	  women	  to	  a	  greater	  degree	  in	  Ethiopia.54	  
Azim	  Premji	  Case	  Study	  	   The	  fourth	  case	  study	  I	  analyzed	  was	  another	  randomized	  control	  trial	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  state	  of	  India	  and	  was	  implemented	  by	  the	  Azim	  Premji	  Foundation,	  with	  help	  from	  the	  NGO	  Educational	  Initiatives.	  Along	  with	  the	  foundation,	  the	  program	  had	  financial	  backing	  from	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  DFID.	  This	  program	  took	  place	  from	  2006	  -­‐2007.	  Much	  like	  the	  plan	  implemented	  by	  Twaweza,	  the	  scheme	  by	  Azim	  Premji	  proposed	  four	  different	  interventions	  that	  varied	  from	  input-­‐aid	  only	  to	  output-­‐aid	  only.	  	  The	  first	  intervention	  involved	  no	  additional	  money	  for	  schools	  but	  consisted	  of	  detailed	  feedback	  on,	  and	  to,	  teachers	  in	  order	  to	  help	  teachers	  pinpoint	  they	  could	  better	  help	  students	  learn.	  The	  second	  intervention	  was	  to	  give	  an	  additional	  block	  grant	  for	  inputs	  to	  each	  school.	  The	  third	  intervention	  was	  to	  add	  contract	  teachers	  to	  schools	  since	  in	  India	  government	  teachers	  are	  paid	  without	  much	  accountability	  and	  are	  known	  to	  be	  frequently	  absent,	  a	  potential	  reason	  for	  low	  learning	  achievement.	  The	  fourth	  intervention	  was	  an	  outcome-­‐based	  scheme	  but	  was	  not	  COD,	  RBA,	  or	  OBA,	  because	  teachers	  were	  paid	  in	  bonuses	  if	  test	  scores	  increased	  above	  the	  initial	  baseline	  by	  5%	  or	  more.	  This	  bonus	  was	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not	  a	  set	  payment,	  but	  based	  on	  a	  formula,	  which	  depended	  on	  the	  percent	  improvement	  in	  the	  test	  scores.	  There	  were	  two	  variations	  of	  the	  fourth	  intervention;	  one	  that	  paid	  the	  teacher	  based	  on	  the	  school’s	  average	  test	  score	  and	  one	  that	  paid	  teachers	  directly	  based	  on	  their	  class’	  average	  score.	  	  This	  was	  to	  assess	  if	  payment	  to	  an	  individual	  or	  group	  level	  was	  more	  incentivizing.	  To	  ensure	  correct	  reporting	  of	  test	  scores,	  economist	  Karthik	  Muralidharan	  and	  other	  researchers	  compiled	  data	  by	  random	  sampling	  of	  schools	  in	  the	  experimental	  districts.55	  
International	  Child	  Support	  Case	  Study	  International	  Child	  Support,	  a	  Dutch	  NGO,	  implemented	  the	  last	  Education	  case	  study	  I	  analyzed.	  This	  intervention	  took	  place	  in	  Kenya	  from	  1998-­‐2000	  and	  was	  focused	  on	  student	  success	  in	  grades	  fourth	  through	  eighth.	  Students’	  test	  scores	  on	  the	  Kenyan	  district	  exams	  for	  each	  specific	  grade	  level	  were	  used	  to	  determine	  student	  success,	  making	  this	  an	  outcome-­‐based	  RBF	  scheme.	  All	  the	  results	  from	  this	  program	  were	  studied	  and	  verified	  by	  economist	  Paul	  Glewwe	  and	  others.	  	  This	  program	  was	  focused	  on	  incentivizing	  at	  the	  teacher	  level,	  but	  differed	  slightly	  from	  the	  other	  case	  studies	  in	  that	  instead	  of	  payments,	  the	  teacher	  bonuses	  were	  materials	  such	  as	  plates,	  cutlery,	  tea	  sets,	  blankets,	  etc.	  In	  monetary	  terms,	  these	  prizes	  were	  worth	  about	  20%	  to	  40%	  of	  a	  teacher’s	  monthly	  salary.	  This	  program	  also	  differed	  in	  that	  it	  was	  a	  competition	  amongst	  teachers	  and	  schools,	  not	  everyone	  could	  receive	  a	  prize.	  Only	  teachers	  at	  about	  half	  of	  the	  schools	  involved	  in	  the	  incentivized	  scheme	  received	  some	  sort	  of	  prize.	  The	  test	  results	  were	  analyzed	  for	  absolute	  performance	  and	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improvement	  from	  a	  baseline	  score	  set	  by	  scores	  from	  the	  previous	  years.	  The	  teachers	  from	  the	  top	  performing	  schools	  for	  each	  category	  of	  score	  analysis	  were	  awarded.56	  Although	  not	  an	  explicit	  indicator,	  there	  was	  also	  an	  output-­‐based	  component	  to	  this	  program.	  The	  exam	  scores	  on	  which	  schools	  and	  teachers	  were	  evaluated	  was	  a	  median	  test	  score	  of	  the	  classroom	  or	  school	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  total	  number	  of	  students	  enrolled	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  term	  was	  the	  number	  of	  students	  used	  in	  calculating	  the	  median,	  even	  if	  students	  had	  dropped	  out	  by	  the	  time	  the	  test	  was	  taken.	  The	  hope	  for	  doing	  this	  was	  that	  it	  would	  also	  decrease	  student	  drop-­‐out	  rates.	  	  
Education	  Case	  Study	  Summary	  Overall,	  clear	  themes	  are	  visible	  within	  RBF	  usage	  in	  the	  Education	  sector.	  First,	  even	  though	  it	  was	  my	  intention	  of	  pulling	  case	  studies	  from	  all	  different	  regions	  of	  the	  world,	  I	  was	  not	  able	  to	  find	  well-­‐documented	  supply-­‐side	  RBF	  schemes	  in	  certain	  regions.	  For	  example,	  I	  found	  Education	  RBF	  schemes	  in	  Latin	  America,	  but	  all	  were	  demand-­‐side	  and	  thus	  not	  applicable	  to	  this	  study.	  Through	  the	  case	  studies,	  it	  seems	  that	  many	  of	  the	  RBF	  schemes	  have	  similar	  funding	  sources,	  more	  specifically	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  DFID.	  Across	  all	  the	  programs,	  outcome	  incentives,	  i.e	  exam	  scores,	  were	  used	  far	  more	  frequently	  than	  output	  incentives,	  i.e	  attendance,	  graduation	  rates,	  etc.	  	  When	  it	  came	  to	  measuring,	  almost	  all	  the	  programs	  paid	  based	  on	  improvement	  over	  the	  baseline	  and	  not	  on	  absolute	  scoring.	  Also,	  all	  the	  programs	  were	  paid	  relative	  to	  their	  achievement,	  not	  an	  absolute	  amount.	  A	  certain	  amount	  of	  money,	  or	  type	  of	  gift,	  was	  given	  out	  per	  additional	  passing	  student	  or	  per	  percentage	  point	  higher	  above	  a	  baseline	  or	  other	  stated	  goal.	  Thus,	  payments	  given	  in	  all	  the	  programs	  could	  change	  based	  on	  the	  level	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of	  achievement;	  they	  were	  not	  fixed	  payments	  based	  on	  achieving	  a	  specific	  goal.	  	  All	  the	  programs	  also	  used	  outside	  consultants	  for	  verification	  of	  reported	  results,	  usually	  in	  the	  form	  of	  random	  sampling	  or	  randomized	  control	  trial	  experiments.	  	  Despite	  these	  similarities,	  many	  of	  the	  programs	  varied	  on	  a	  few	  of	  the	  elements.	  All	  of	  the	  programs	  differed	  in	  payment	  amount	  and	  recipients	  when	  results	  were	  achieved.	  Some	  paid	  to	  teachers	  or	  schools	  directly	  while	  others	  paid	  to	  local	  or	  national	  government.	  The	  payments	  differed	  in	  that	  some	  were	  set	  amounts	  per	  pupil	  while	  others	  were	  based	  on	  a	  formula.	  Most	  payments	  were	  given	  in	  money	  while	  one	  case	  awarded	  prizes	  instead.	  There	  also	  was	  not	  a	  specific	  school-­‐level	  that	  was	  addressed	  across	  programs.	  There	  was	  great	  variation	  on	  whether	  primary	  or	  secondary	  school	  was	  the	  addressed	  population.	  	  	  
Healthcare	  Case	  Studies	  
	   Next,	  I	  analyzed	  five	  case	  studies	  of	  RBF	  programs	  in	  the	  Health	  sector.	  Table	  2	  below,	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  above	  in	  Education,	  summarizes	  the	  case	  studies	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  five	  points	  I	  found	  pivotal	  for	  my	  research	  questions.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Taliaferro	  34	  	  
	  
Table	  2:	  Health	  Case	  Study	  Comparison	  




World	  Bank,	  African	  Development	  Bank,	  European	  Commission,	  UK	  &	  Sweden	  	  
World	  Bank	  &	  University	  of	  California	  Berkeley	  	  
USAID	   Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank	  &	  N.	  Emergency	  Social	  Investment	  Fund.	  
EC,	  USAID	  &	  World	  Bank	  
Level	  of	  
Intervention	  
Hospital	  Level	   Local	  Government	  Level	  	   NGO	  Level	   Hospital,	  NGO,	  and	  Household	  Level	  	   NGO	  Level	  
Incentive	  
Payments	  
(fees	  *	  quantity)	  *	  (%	  quality	  score)	   5	  USD	  	  (+3	  if	  all	  indicators	  met)/	  person/	  month	  	  
5%	  gain	  or	  lost	  in	  budget	  	   Unit	  cost/	  service	  &	  offered	  to	  95%	  of	  group	  
10%	  bonus	  of	  contract	  value	  
Measurement	  
Used	  	  
Quantity	  &	  quality	  assessment	   10	  indicators	  	   7	  indicators	  by	  %	  improvement	   Preventative	  indicators	  	   Mix	  of	  input,	  process	  &	  outputs	  
	  
World	  Bank	  (and	  others)	  Case	  Studies	  The	  first	  case	  study	  presented	  was	  implemented	  in	  Rwanda.	  This	  program	  was	  funded	  by	  several	  organizations	  working	  in	  partnership	  with	  one	  another:	  the	  World	  Bank,	  European	  Commission,	  African	  Development	  Bank,	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  Sweden,	  and	  several	  Dutch	  NGOs.	  Within	  the	  country,	  there	  were	  two	  pilot	  RBF	  programs	  launched	  in	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the	  regions	  of	  Butare	  and	  Cyangugu	  in	  2002.	  Then	  in	  2005	  another	  was	  launched	  in	  the	  regions	  of	  Kigali-­‐Ngali,	  Kabgayi,	  and	  Kigali	  Ville,	  which	  lasted	  several	  years	  until	  adopted	  nationally	  by	  the	  government.	  These	  programs	  were	  paid	  for	  a	  set	  of	  specific	  indicators	  per	  unit	  administered,	  although	  a	  quality	  component	  also	  impacted	  the	  payment.	  This	  was	  a	  PBF	  scheme,	  as	  all	  of	  the	  payments	  for	  achieved	  outputs	  were	  given	  directly	  to	  the	  facilities	  to	  then	  be	  given	  to	  staff	  or	  used	  to	  improve	  the	  facility.	  Random	  crosscheck	  third	  party	  verification	  was	  used,	  although	  the	  organizations	  contracted	  for	  the	  job	  were	  different	  for	  each	  region.	  For	  example,	  the	  Butare	  region	  commissioned	  the	  School	  of	  Public	  Health,	  while	  Cyangugu	  hired	  a	  series	  of	  officers	  and	  supervisors	  as	  verifying	  consultants.	  	   Like	  most	  of	  the	  Health	  RBF	  schemes,	  there	  were	  several	  indicators	  that	  the	  Rwandan	  programs	  specifically	  wanted	  to	  improve	  and	  thus	  pay	  for.	  There	  were	  14	  indicators	  in	  all,	  but	  not	  all	  specifically	  mentioned	  in	  the	  case	  study.	  It	  is	  clear,	  however,	  that	  the	  programs	  focused	  on	  HIV/AIDS	  services,	  TB	  and	  malaria	  services,	  vaccinations,	  medical	  personnel	  assisted	  births,	  hospital	  births,	  prenatal	  consultations,	  growth	  monitoring,	  and	  malnutrition	  treatment	  for	  children	  under	  five.	  Extra	  emphasis	  and,	  therefore,	  money	  was	  awarded	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  HIV/AIDS	  treatment	  outputs.	  On	  top	  of	  services,	  there	  was	  also	  a	  quality	  evaluation	  of	  the	  hospitals	  and	  clinics.	  This	  quality	  assessment	  consisted	  of	  fifty	  criteria	  pertaining	  to	  three	  main	  areas:	  administration,	  quality	  assurance,	  and	  clinical	  activities.	  	  The	  budget	  was	  different	  for	  each	  province,	  but	  there	  was	  a	  standard	  equation	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  payment	  awarded	  to	  each	  hospital:	  	  
• RBF	  earnings=	  (fees/service	  x	  quantity)	  x	  (%	  quality	  score).	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There	  was	  a	  price	  assigned	  to	  each	  service	  indicator,	  which	  was	  then	  multiplied	  by	  the	  number	  of	  times	  that	  service	  was	  administered	  by	  each	  hospital.	  This	  amount	  was	  then	  multiplied	  by	  the	  quality	  score	  given	  to	  each	  hospital	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  total	  possible	  points	  a	  hospital	  could	  earn.	  The	  fee	  paid	  per	  treatment	  differed	  in	  each	  region	  and	  for	  each	  treatment	  but	  on	  average	  was	  anywhere	  from	  $0.30	  to	  $2.00	  USD	  per	  capita.	  The	  payments	  were	  disbursed	  quarterly	  to	  the	  facilities.62	  Next,	  I	  investigated	  the	  case	  study	  on	  Plan	  Nacer	  in	  Argentina.	  Plan	  Nacer	  was	  a	  COD	  scheme	  initiated	  in	  2004	  and	  was	  focused	  on	  bettering	  maternal	  and	  child	  health	  for	  the	  uninsured.	  It	  originated	  in	  the	  northern	  provinces	  of	  Argentina	  and	  by	  2007	  was	  a	  national	  program.	  The	  budget	  for	  this	  program	  was	  overseen	  by	  the	  Argentinean	  government	  but	  was	  mostly	  supported	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  with	  extra	  support	  and	  research	  done	  by	  the	  University	  of	  California	  Berkeley.	  Third	  party	  verification	  was	  also	  used,	  and	  issued	  bimonthly	  clinic	  reports.	  	  This	  program	  had	  10	  output-­‐oriented	  indicators:	  prenatal	  checkup	  before	  twenty	  weeks,	  effective	  obstetric	  and	  neonatal	  care	  (APGAR	  score	  >6),	  birth	  weight	  over	  2,500	  grams,	  VDRL	  and	  tetanus	  vaccinations	  given	  to	  mother	  during	  pregnancy,	  case	  review	  of	  infant	  and	  maternal	  deaths,	  measles	  vaccines	  given	  to	  children	  under	  eighteen	  months,	  mothers	  who	  receive	  reproductive	  health	  counseling	  after	  delivery,	  children	  under	  one	  with	  a	  complete	  record	  of	  necessary	  check-­‐ups,	  children	  under	  six	  with	  complete	  records	  of	  check-­‐ups	  and	  weight	  and	  height	  percentile,	  and	  staff	  trained	  with	  specific	  knowledge	  to	  care	  for	  indigenous	  populations.	  For	  each	  eligible	  uninsured	  mother	  and	  child	  enrolled	  in	  the	  program,	  the	  Argentinean	  National	  Government	  disbursed	  $5/person/month	  on	  a	  per	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capita	  basis	  to	  the	  local	  province	  government	  who	  then	  distributed	  the	  money	  to	  its	  clinics	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  clinic’s	  annual	  budget.	  Further,	  the	  government	  could	  also	  disburse	  an	  extra	  $3/person/month	  if	  the	  indicators	  or	  health	  targets,	  were	  being	  achieved.	  Payments	  could	  also	  be	  deducted	  if	  the	  third	  party	  verification	  caught	  clinics	  misreporting	  roster	  information	  and	  tracers.	  Also,	  the	  national	  government	  could	  have	  been	  fined	  for	  not	  relaying	  money	  to	  provinces	  correctly.63	  
USAID	  Case	  Study	  Next	  was	  the	  case	  study	  for	  the	  USAID-­‐funded	  RBF	  scheme	  in	  Haiti	  from	  1999-­‐	  2007.	  Although	  funded	  by	  USAID,	  the	  US-­‐based	  NGO	  Management	  Sciences	  for	  Health	  implemented	  the	  scheme.	  This	  NGO	  picked	  Centres	  pour	  le	  Développement	  et	  la	  Santé,	  Comité	  Bienfaisance	  de	  Pignon,	  and	  Save	  the	  Children,	  other	  NGOs	  working	  on	  health	  in	  Haiti,	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  this	  pilot	  program.	  	  In	  addition,	  an	  independent	  research	  firm,	  Institut	  Haitien	  de	  l’Enfance,	  was	  hired	  to	  verify	  results.	  The	  NGOs	  in	  the	  program	  received	  95%	  of	  their	  promised	  annual	  funding	  up	  front.	  If	  they	  achieved	  all	  the	  indicator	  targets	  they	  could	  earn	  another	  10%,	  receiving	  a	  total	  of	  105%	  of	  their	  annual	  funding.	  If	  they	  failed	  to	  meet	  their	  targets,	  however,	  they	  received	  no	  further	  funding,	  losing	  the	  last	  5%	  of	  their	  normal	  support.	  With	  firms	  being	  the	  targeted	  intervention	  level	  in	  this	  case	  study,	  it	  is	  an	  OBA	  scheme.	  	  There	  were	  seven	  output	  indicators	  agreed	  upon	  with	  the	  NGOs	  contracted	  by	  Management	  Sciences	  for	  Health.	  A	  baseline	  was	  taken	  and	  from	  it	  the	  NGO	  had	  to	  increase	  or	  reduce	  the	  indicator	  by	  a	  certain	  percentage.	  	  The	  target	  goals	  were:	  15%	  increase	  in	  mothers	  who	  use	  oral	  rehydration	  solution	  for	  children	  with	  diarrhea,	  10%	  increase	  in	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children	  eleven	  months	  and	  youngers	  who	  are	  fully	  vaccinated,	  20%	  increase	  in	  women	  who	  have	  three	  prenatal	  visits,	  25%	  reduction	  in	  level	  of	  discontinuation	  of	  contraceptives,	  50%	  increase	  in	  institutional	  births,	  50%	  reduction	  in	  pediatric	  waiting	  time,	  and	  participation	  in	  establishing	  local	  community	  health	  centers.	  It	  was	  possible	  to	  earn	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  bonus	  if	  only	  some	  indicator	  targets	  were	  reached.64	  
Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank	  Case	  Study	  The	  Nicaraguan	  case	  study	  was	  about	  the	  el	  Red	  de	  Protección	  Social	  program	  that	  ran	  from	  2000-­‐2005.	  The	  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank	  funded	  this	  program	  while	  the	  Nicaraguan	  Emergency	  Social	  Investment	  Fund	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  its	  implementation.	  	  In	  addition,	  this	  program	  also	  used	  the	  Food	  Policy	  Research	  Institute	  to	  conduct	  randomized	  evaluations	  of	  results	  and	  impact.	  As	  stated	  previously	  in	  the	  Education	  case	  studies,	  many	  of	  the	  programs	  found	  in	  Latin	  America	  were	  demand-­‐side	  programs.	  However,	  this	  program	  in	  Nicaragua	  was	  unique	  in	  that	  it	  combined	  both	  supply-­‐side	  and	  demand-­‐side	  RBF	  schemes.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  case	  analysis,	  I	  only	  focused	  on	  the	  supply-­‐side	  program,	  which	  took	  the	  form	  of	  a	  PBF	  scheme.	  	  For	  the	  program,	  there	  were	  no	  specific	  indicators	  but	  were	  broadly	  defined	  as	  any	  treatment	  that	  was	  deemed	  preventative,	  such	  as	  vaccines	  or	  prenatal	  visits,	  thus	  making	  the	  indicators	  output	  measures.	  The	  clinics	  were	  paid	  a	  specified	  amount	  per	  health	  service	  provided	  and	  were	  paid	  on	  a	  quarterly	  basis	  with	  3%	  of	  the	  total	  potential	  earnings	  paid	  upfront.	  The	  clinics	  would	  only	  receive	  the	  full	  incentive	  price	  for	  each	  service	  provided	  if	  the	  clinic	  provided	  preventative	  services	  to	  at	  least	  95%	  of	  individuals	  in	  each	  category:	  children	  under	  five,	  women,	  pregnant	  women,	  etc.	  	  The	  population	  around	  the	  clinic	  was	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surveyed,	  providing	  a	  baseline	  to	  determine	  what	  percentage	  of	  the	  population	  the	  clinic	  served.65	  
European	  Commission	  Case	  Study	  Lastly,	  I	  analyzed	  a	  case	  study	  of	  a	  Health	  RBF	  scheme	  in	  Afghanistan.	  This	  program	  started	  in	  2003	  and	  was	  jointly	  funded	  by	  the	  European	  Commission,	  USAID,	  and	  the	  World	  Bank.	  	  These	  donors,	  with	  the	  help	  from	  the	  Afghan	  Ministry	  of	  Health,	  entered	  into	  OBA	  scheme	  contracts	  with	  about	  55	  NGOs	  providing	  basic	  healthcare	  services	  within	  the	  country.	  These	  contracts	  usually	  were	  entered	  into	  for	  a	  24	  to	  36	  month	  period	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  renewal.	  Most	  of	  the	  performance-­‐based	  contracts	  were	  through	  the	  World	  Bank.	  The	  donors	  paid	  directly	  to	  NGOs,	  except	  for	  some	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  contracts	  that	  funneled	  the	  payments	  through	  the	  Afghan	  Ministry	  of	  Finance.	  All	  the	  funders	  were	  responsible	  for	  the	  verification	  of	  the	  results	  reported	  by	  the	  NGOs	  they	  contracted.	  The	  contracts	  and	  indicators	  measured	  varied	  depending	  on	  donor	  and	  the	  NGO	  involved.	  	  The	  performance-­‐based	  partnerships	  through	  the	  World	  Bank	  offered	  the	  chance	  of	  a	  10%	  bonus	  of	  total	  contract	  amount.	  The	  first	  5%	  of	  the	  bonus	  could	  be	  earned	  if	  the	  NGOs	  were	  able	  to	  see	  a	  10%	  increase	  above	  the	  baseline	  in	  the	  chosen	  indicators.	  The	  other	  5%	  was	  awarded	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  contract	  if	  indicator	  measurements	  increased	  50%	  above	  baseline.	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Health	  was	  also	  eligible	  for	  a	  bonus	  in	  aid	  money	  if	  the	  NGO	  contractors	  they	  recruited	  achieved	  their	  target	  goals.	  The	  specific	  indicators	  are	  not	  mentioned	  in	  the	  case	  study	  but	  are	  said	  to	  focus	  on	  maternal,	  reproductive,	  and	  child	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health	  and	  are	  a	  mixture	  of	  input	  and	  output-­‐based	  measures.	  66	  
Health	  Case	  Study	  Summary	  	  As	  intended,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  find	  Health	  RBF	  case	  studies	  across	  all	  developing	  regions	  of	  the	  world.	  Beyond	  that,	  there	  was	  also	  variation	  among	  almost	  all	  the	  other	  categories:	  funders,	  indicators,	  intervention	  level,	  and	  payment	  disbursement.	  Even	  with	  some	  variation,	  there	  were	  clear	  themes	  amongst	  the	  case	  studies.	  One	  commonality	  among	  all	  programs	  was	  the	  use	  third	  party	  verification.	  The	  World	  Bank	  was	  involved	  in	  many	  of	  the	  projects,	  yet	  many	  other	  large	  organizations	  and	  governments	  were	  also	  involved	  in	  almost	  every	  project.	  The	  specific	  indicators	  varied	  slightly	  amongst	  projects,	  but	  most	  focused	  on	  women	  and	  children’s	  health	  issues	  and	  all	  were	  output-­‐based	  measures.	  Most	  of	  the	  interventions	  were	  directed	  towards	  NGOs	  while	  a	  few	  were	  hospital	  or	  local	  government-­‐focused.	  Finally,	  some	  used	  a	  formula	  or	  payment	  per	  person	  or	  service,	  allowing	  payment	  to	  vary	  based	  on	  the	  level	  of	  achievement.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  many	  of	  the	  schemes	  made	  lump-­‐sum	  payments	  based	  on	  a	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  awarded	  grant	  money	  that	  were	  paid	  out	  for	  reaching	  certain	  achievement	  goals.	  	  
Health	  and	  Education	  Case	  Study	  Comparison	  
Funding	  Source	  
	   In	  looking	  at	  the	  case	  studies	  from	  both	  the	  Education	  and	  Health	  sectors,	  there	  were	  differences	  and	  similarities	  between	  the	  two	  sectors.	  	  For	  funding,	  there	  was	  a	  variation	  of	  sources	  in	  each	  sector;	  however,	  a	  common	  source	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  projects	  in	  both	  sectors	  was	  the	  World	  Bank,	  which	  was	  associated	  with	  five	  programs	  overall.	  In	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Education,	  the	  next	  most	  common	  donor	  was	  DFID	  that	  funded,	  or	  helped	  fund,	  three	  programs.	  DFID	  is	  not	  explicitly	  mentioned	  in	  any	  of	  the	  RBF	  Health	  programs,	  but	  is	  an	  entity	  of	  the	  UK	  government,	  which	  was	  a	  funder	  of	  the	  RBF	  Health	  program	  in	  Rwanda.	  For	  Health,	  the	  next	  most	  common	  funders	  were	  USAID	  and	  the	  European	  Commission,	  which	  both	  helped	  fund	  two	  projects.	  Neither	  USAID	  nor	  the	  European	  Commission	  was	  present	  in	  the	  RBF	  Education	  schemes	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  which	  I	  have	  studied.	  	  
Intervention	  Level	  	  	   Unlike	  funding	  source,	  there	  was	  less	  overlap	  in	  the	  other	  areas	  between	  sectors.	  In	  both	  sectors,	  there	  were	  some	  programs	  that	  focused	  on	  paying	  directly	  to	  facilities,	  such	  as	  a	  school	  or	  clinic,	  when	  results	  were	  achieved.	  This	  payment	  structure	  was	  present	  in	  two	  programs	  in	  both	  Education	  and	  Health.	  In	  Education,	  paying	  to	  the	  government	  was	  much	  more	  common	  than	  in	  Health	  but	  was	  seen	  in	  both	  sectors.	  Three	  programs	  in	  Education	  paid	  to	  governments,	  one	  to	  local	  and	  two	  to	  national	  governments.	  Even	  those	  that	  did	  not	  pay	  directly	  to	  governments	  still	  paid	  out	  to	  government-­‐run	  schools	  with	  government	  salaried	  teachers.	  In	  Health,	  only	  one	  program	  paid	  to	  a	  government	  and	  it	  was	  a	  local	  one.	  Paying	  to	  NGOs	  was	  only	  seen	  in	  Health,	  and	  occurred	  in	  three	  programs.	  In	  Education,	  programs	  also	  paid	  to	  individuals,	  i.e.	  teachers,	  while	  in	  Health	  none	  paid	  to	  individuals,	  except	  in	  a	  demand-­‐side	  capacity,	  which	  was	  not	  analyzed.	  Overall,	  the	  Education	  programs	  paid	  overwhelmingly	  to	  the	  public	  sector	  while	  the	  Health	  sector	  was	  split	  between	  some	  public	  programs	  and	  others	  focusing	  on	  NGOs.	  	  
Incentive	  Payments	  	  For	  payment	  structures	  in	  both	  Health	  and	  Education,	  a	  payment	  per	  person	  or	  per	  unit	  was	  used.	  This	  was	  the	  most	  common	  type	  of	  payment	  in	  Education,	  as	  three	  of	  the	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programs	  paid	  on	  a	  per	  student	  basis.	  In	  Health,	  there	  was	  one	  case	  study	  that	  paid	  per	  person	  and	  two	  others	  that	  paid	  per	  service	  administered.	  One	  program	  paid	  not	  only	  for	  services,	  but	  also	  based	  on	  clinic	  quality,	  while	  another	  paid	  per	  person	  as	  long	  a	  certain	  percentage	  of	  the	  total	  population	  was	  being	  treated.	  Additionally,	  paying	  a	  fixed	  lump-­‐sum	  amount	  as	  a	  percent	  of	  a	  grant	  for	  achieving	  said	  goals	  was	  seen	  in	  Health	  but	  not	  in	  Education.	  Instead,	  when	  bonus	  payments	  were	  used	  in	  Education,	  as	  seen	  in	  two	  case	  studies,	  it	  was	  calculated	  in	  proportion	  to	  an	  achievement.	  	  
Indicators	  and	  Measurements	  Used	  	   The	  types	  of	  indicators	  chosen	  and	  measured	  were	  almost	  identical	  within,	  but	  not	  across,	  the	  two	  sectors.	  All	  the	  RBF	  Education	  programs	  used	  outcome	  indicators,	  mostly	  test	  scored.	  However,	  one	  scheme	  did	  supplement	  the	  outcome	  targets	  with	  an	  output	  measure	  that	  focused	  on	  teacher	  competencies.	  In	  contrast,	  all	  of	  the	  RBF	  Health	  programs	  measured	  output-­‐based	  indicators	  such	  as	  vaccines,	  prenatal	  visits,	  institutional	  births	  etc.	  Additionally,	  third	  party	  verification	  was	  used	  to	  verify	  results	  in	  all	  programs	  in	  both	  sectors.	  	  	  
Starting	  Year	  of	  Intervention	  I	  observed	  two	  other	  interesting	  phenomena	  when	  comparing	  the	  Education	  and	  Health	  case	  studies.	  The	  first	  was	  the	  years	  in	  which	  the	  programs	  initiated.	  Overwhelmingly	  more	  of	  the	  Health	  programs	  began	  before	  the	  Education	  ones.	  Three	  of	  the	  Education	  programs	  just	  started	  in	  recent	  years,	  2011-­‐2013,	  while	  the	  other	  two	  were	  from	  the	  late	  1990’s	  and	  early	  2000’s.	  All	  of	  the	  health	  programs	  I	  analyzed,	  however,	  were	  started	  in	  the	  late	  1990’s	  and	  early	  2000’s.	  Secondly,	  two	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  in	  Education	  
Taliaferro	  43	  	  
	  
were	  randomized	  control	  trials	  to	  test	  which	  intervention	  level	  was	  better,	  yet	  none	  of	  the	  Health	  case	  studies	  doubled	  as	  similar	  research	  projects.	  	  
Debate	  regarding	  the	  Right	  Level	  of	  Intervention	  in	  the	  Education	  Sector	  While	  the	  case	  studies	  gave	  a	  lot	  of	  insight	  into	  the	  research	  questions,	  literature	  and	  expert	  insight	  allowed	  for	  further	  comprehension	  of	  the	  two	  sectors	  and	  what	  is	  occurring	  in	  them.	  First,	  I	  tried	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  debate	  within	  the	  Education	  sector	  that	  has	  led	  to	  the	  use	  of	  randomized	  control	  trials	  seen	  in	  some	  of	  the	  case	  studies.	  In	  2005,	  researchers	  Paul	  Glewwe	  and	  Michael	  Kremer	  recommended	  using	  more	  randomized	  evaluations	  to	  better	  assess	  Education,	  especially	  in	  the	  developing	  world,	  because	  of	  the	  many	  potential	  factors	  that	  affect	  learning	  achievement	  such	  as	  distorted	  budgets	  and	  weak	  incentives	  for	  teachers.67	  As	  Glewwe	  and	  Kremer	  mentioned,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  lot	  of	  debate	  over	  whether	  or	  not	  individual	  teacher	  incentives	  can	  improve	  learning	  in	  developing	  countries.	  In	  many	  countries,	  it	  has	  been	  observed	  that	  teachers	  are	  incredibly	  under	  certified	  and	  are	  subject	  to	  little	  regulation	  leading	  to	  a	  lot	  of	  teacher	  absenteeism.68	  These	  alarming	  facts	  led	  researchers	  to	  test	  whether	  increasing	  teacher	  quality	  by	  incentivizing	  teachers	  with	  performance	  pay	  would	  lead	  to	  better	  student	  outcomes.	   	  In	  two	  different	  studies	  that	  took	  place	  in	  India,	  teacher	  performance	  pay	  programs	  significantly	  increased	  student	  test	  scores	  versus	  schools	  without	  incentive	  programs.	  In	  the	  case	  study	  that	  took	  place	  in	  India	  analyzed	  above	  in	  this	  chapter,	  students	  in	  schools	  with	  incentive	  pay	  for	  teachers	  scored	  on	  average	  9.2	  percent	  higher	  on	  exams	  than	  control	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schools.	  This	  result	  was	  observed	  even	  on	  non-­‐repeat	  questions,	  showing	  that	  teaching	  to	  the	  test	  was	  not	  an	  interfering	  factor.69	  These	  effects	  were	  not	  seen	  for	  just	  one	  or	  two	  years,	  but	  lasted	  over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  five-­‐year	  program.	  In	  a	  separate	  trial,	  a	  large	  correlation	  was	  found	  between	  teacher	  quality	  and	  student	  achievement.	  Researchers	  showed	  that	  a	  student	  taught	  by	  a	  teacher	  who	  was	  considered	  in	  the	  90th	  percentile	  for	  quality	  scored	  1.271	  standard	  deviations	  above	  students	  taught	  by	  teachers	  in	  the	  10th	  percentile.70	  This	  study	  also	  compared	  the	  results	  with	  similar	  studies	  done	  developed	  countries	  and	  found	  that	  teacher	  quality	  had	  a	  larger	  effect	  on	  student	  achievement	  in	  developing	  countries	  than	  in	  developed	  ones.71	  	  	  Conversely,	  other	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  teacher	  quality	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  see	  significant	  increases	  in	  student	  achievement.	  In	  the	  Kenyan	  case	  study	  previously	  mentioned,	  teacher	  incentives	  proved	  effective	  for	  the	  first	  but	  not	  second	  year	  of	  implementation.	  	  In	  the	  first	  year,	  students	  in	  incentive	  schools	  scored	  an	  average	  of	  10%	  higher	  on	  exams	  than	  students	  in	  control	  schools.	  In	  year	  two,	  however,	  students	  in	  incentive	  schools	  only	  did	  1%	  better	  on	  average.72	  The	  study	  determined	  this	  was	  because	  teachers	  learned	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  incentives	  in	  a	  way	  that	  made	  them	  ineffective	  in	  increasing	  student	  achievement.	  In	  an	  expert	  interview,	  the	  interviewee	  held	  an	  opinion	  that	  is	  supported	  by	  this	  data.	  His	  belief	  was	  that	  teacher	  improvement	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  maximize	  student	  achievement	  in	  developing	  countries.	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Beyond	  individual-­‐level	  incentives,	  there	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  debate	  over	  whether	  a	  decentralized	  school	  system	  would	  increase	  learning.	  School	  systems	  in	  most	  developing	  countries	  are	  highly	  centralized,	  most	  likely	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  colonial	  history.	  This	  highly	  centralized	  system	  leads	  to	  a	  single	  curriculum	  for	  the	  entire	  country	  that	  is	  usually	  geared	  towards	  the	  elite.73	  The	  alternative	  to	  this	  would	  be	  a	  more	  local-­‐focused	  or	  decentralized	  school	  system.	  	  Having	  knowledge	  of	  this	  debate	  and	  literature	  led	  Twaweza,	  in	  the	  Tanzanian	  case	  study,	  to	  include	  school	  and	  district	  incentive	  interventions	  as	  a	  part	  of	  their	  randomized	  control	  trial.	  Unlike	  in	  Education,	  there	  was	  no	  similar	  debate	  over	  intervention	  levels	  visible	  in	  the	  Health	  sector	  literature.	  	  
Outputs	  Becoming	  Outcomes	  In	  Education	  &	  Health	  	  
	   Continuing	  on	  with	  investigating	  the	  research	  questions,	  I	  looked	  at	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  outputs	  translated	  into	  outcomes	  in	  both	  Education	  and	  Health.	  	  As	  stated	  previously,	  this	  relationship	  is	  important	  because	  it	  could	  potentially	  impact	  the	  usage	  of	  RBF	  by	  influencing	  the	  type	  of	  indicators	  chosen	  and	  measurement	  system	  used	  in	  programs.	  	  	   In	  Health	  there	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  stronger	  and	  more	  established	  relationships	  between	  outputs	  and	  outcomes.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  well	  established	  that	  health	  outputs,	  such	  as	  vaccination	  rates,	  lead	  to	  better	  health	  outcomes,	  such	  as	  the	  decrease	  in	  communicable	  diseases.	  This	  is	  exemplified	  in	  the	  childhood	  vaccination	  initiatives	  that	  have	  been	  occurring	  in	  developing	  countries.	  Between	  the	  years	  2000-­‐2012	  the	  global	  coverage	  for	  the	  measles	  vaccine	  increased	  from	  72%	  to	  84%.	  In	  that	  same	  time	  period,	  the	  amount	  of	  deaths	  per	  year	  due	  to	  measles	  decreased	  from	  562,000	  to	  122,000.	  Not	  only	  did	  these	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vaccines	  decrease	  deaths,	  but	  also	  prevented	  an	  estimated	  14	  million	  deaths,	  mostly	  in	  developing	  countries.74	  	  Similar	  trends	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  maternal	  health.	  From	  1990-­‐2012,	  births	  that	  were	  attended	  by	  healthcare	  professionals	  increased	  from	  56%	  to	  68%.	  In	  that	  time,	  the	  amount	  of	  pregnant	  women	  who	  received	  at	  least	  four	  antenatal	  visits	  increased	  from	  37%	  to	  52%.75	  Consequently,	  since	  1990,	  the	  maternal	  mortality	  rate	  has	  also	  decreased	  by	  45%,	  from	  380	  to	  210	  deaths	  per	  100,000	  live	  births.	  76	  	  These	  examples	  not	  only	  show	  improvements	  in	  the	  Health	  sector,	  but	  also	  show	  a	  significant	  correlation	  between	  outputs	  and	  outcomes.	  In	  the	  time	  it	  took	  to	  increase	  healthcare	  professionals	  at	  births	  by	  12%	  and	  at	  least	  four	  antenatal	  visits	  by	  15%,	  maternal	  mortality	  decreased	  45%.	  This	  displays	  that	  for	  every	  percent	  improvement	  in	  outputs,	  there	  was	  about	  1.67%	  improvement	  in	  outcomes.	  These	  are	  just	  a	  few	  examples	  of	  a	  seemingly	  larger	  and	  consistent	  trend	  in	  Health	  of	  output-­‐based	  initiatives	  leading	  to	  very	  visible	  decreases	  in	  death	  and	  increases	  in	  life-­‐quality.	  	  	   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  Education,	  there	  is	  less	  of	  an	  indication	  that	  more	  outputs	  are	  leading	  to	  better	  outcomes.	  From	  1990-­‐2013,	  there	  was	  a	  net	  increase	  of	  10%,	  from	  80%	  to	  90%,	  in	  net	  the	  primary	  school	  enrollment	  rate	  for	  children	  in	  developing	  countries.	  In	  some	  regions,	  such	  as	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  this	  increase	  has	  been	  far	  more	  dramatic,	  going	  from	  52%	  to	  78%.	  Similarly,	  there	  has	  been	  an	  increase	  in	  secondary	  school	  enrollment.	  From	  2005-­‐	  2012,	  the	  gross	  enrollment	  in	  secondary	  schools	  in	  low-­‐income	  countries	  increased	  from	  34.5%	  to	  44.3%.	  Despite	  these	  increases	  in	  enrollment,	  an	  output	  measure,	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there	  seems	  to	  be	  little	  improvement	  in	  educational	  outcomes,	  such	  as	  increased	  literacy	  and	  numeracy	  skills.	  	  From	  1990-­‐2013,	  there	  has	  only	  been	  a	  6%	  increase,	  from	  83%	  to	  89%,	  in	  youth	  literacy	  in	  the	  developing	  parts	  of	  the	  world.77	  This	  means	  for	  every	  percent	  increase	  in	  enrollment,	  there	  has	  only	  been	  a	  0.6%	  increase	  in	  literacy	  for	  children	  in	  developing	  countries.	  	  Although	  the	  data	  above	  supports	  that	  there	  is	  less	  correlation	  between	  outputs	  and	  outcomes	  in	  Education	  than	  in	  Health,	  the	  results	  do	  show	  some	  correlation	  between	  outputs	  and	  outcomes	  in	  Education.	  	  Unsatisfied	  with	  this	  data,	  however,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  recent	  movement	  among	  NGOs	  to	  further	  expose	  that	  learning	  attainment	  may	  not	  be	  improving	  as	  it	  seems	  and	  is	  still	  extremely	  low	  in	  many	  developing	  countries.	  	  One	  example	  of	  this	  phenomenon	  is	  an	  Indian	  NGO	  ASER	  that	  has	  created	  basic	  literacy	  and	  numeracy	  assessments.	  Meaning	  ‘impact’	  in	  Hindi,	  ASER	  originated	  out	  of	  a	  desire	  to	  measure	  the	  impact	  of	  development	  programs	  in	  order	  to	  empower	  ordinary	  people	  to	  communicate	  with	  others	  to	  better	  pinpoint,	  understand,	  and	  resolve	  problems	  in	  order	  to	  positively	  impact	  the	  world.78	  	   Using	  their	  tests,	  ASER	  has	  surveyed	  children	  learning	  attainment	  in	  almost	  every	  district	  of	  India.	  According	  to	  their	  surveys	  taken	  from	  2006-­‐2014	  in	  India,	  the	  percentage	  of	  children	  in	  grade	  three	  who	  can	  at	  least	  read	  at	  a	  grade	  one	  level	  has	  decreased	  from	  48.1%	  to	  40.3%.	  Similarly	  in	  math,	  surveys	  from	  2007-­‐2014	  have	  shown	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  students	  who	  can	  at	  least	  do	  subtraction	  by	  grade	  three	  has	  decreased	  from	  42.4%	  to	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25.4%.	  These	  statistics	  stand	  true,	  even	  though,	  the	  amount	  of	  children	  enrolled	  in	  primary	  school	  has	  increased	  in	  India	  from	  93.4%	  to	  96.7%	  in	  that	  same	  time	  frame.79	  	  Not	  only	  do	  ASER’s	  results	  indicate	  almost	  no	  correlation	  between	  enrollment	  and	  literacy	  rates,	  but	  also	  seem	  to	  exist	  in	  conflict	  with	  Indian	  Census	  Reports	  on	  literacy.	  In	  the	  census	  covering	  the	  years	  2001-­‐2011,	  an	  increase	  of	  9%,	  from	  65%	  to	  74%,	  in	  literacy	  was	  reported	  for	  people	  of	  the	  age	  seven	  and	  above.80	  This	  evidence	  even	  more	  so	  muddles	  the	  previously	  seen	  correlation	  between	  outputs	  and	  outcomes	  in	  Education.	  In	  agreement,	  an	  expert	  interviewed	  concurred	  there	  is	  far	  fewer	  obvious	  ways	  to	  achieve	  outcomes	  in	  Education.	  A	  published	  report	  by	  DFID	  also	  agrees,	  stating	  that	  measuring	  and	  improving	  learning	  achievement	  is	  much	  less	  straightforward	  than	  doing	  the	  same	  for	  morbidity	  and	  mortality.81	  	  
Aid	  Money	  In	  Education	  and	  Health	  	  In	  order	  to	  investigate	  if	  there	  are	  differing	  amounts	  of	  aid	  going	  into	  each	  field,	  I	  first	  asked	  some	  experts	  on	  foreign	  development	  and	  aid.	  In	  two	  separate	  interviews	  I	  was	  told	  there	  was	  more	  money	  in	  Health	  than	  in	  Education.	  Experts	  provided	  several	  reasons	  for	  this	  trend.	  One	  reason	  is	  that	  Health	  was	  more	  willing	  to	  be	  measured	  at	  an	  early	  time,	  which	  was	  very	  important	  to	  donors,	  and	  thus	  donors	  began	  giving	  more	  to	  the	  Health	  sector.	  Another	  expert	  also	  said	  the	  visibility	  and	  media	  attention	  to	  the	  HIV/AIDS	  crisis	  also	  has	  played	  a	  part	  in	  Health	  surpassing	  Education	  in	  foreign	  aid.	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To	  corroborate	  these	  statements,	  I	  used	  the	  OECD	  database	  to	  find	  the	  estimated	  overall	  aid	  money	  going	  into	  the	  Education	  and	  Health	  sectors	  each	  year.	  In	  approximately	  the	  past	  ten	  years,	  Education	  has	  overall	  been	  receiving	  more	  aid	  money	  than	  Health,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3	  below.	  However,	  in	  2013,	  Health	  surpassed	  Education	  in	  overall	  amount	  of	  funding	  with	  $13029.83	  USD	  in	  millions	  and	  $12797.97	  USD	  in	  millions	  going	  into	  Health	  and	  Education	  respectively.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  data	  show	  that	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  the	  aid	  money	  going	  in	  Health	  is	  continually	  increasing	  at	  a	  linear	  rate.	  Although	  aid	  money	  to	  Education	  has	  also	  increased	  in	  the	  past	  decade,	  it	  has	  done	  so	  at	  a	  much	  slower	  rate	  and	  has	  even	  begun	  to	  decrease	  in	  the	  past	  five	  years.	  	  
Figure	  3:	  Aid	  Money	  Given	  Per	  Year	  By	  Sector	  82	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HRITF.	  This	  trust	  fund	  allotted	  a	  huge	  amount	  of	  aid	  money	  to	  be	  spent	  on	  Health	  and	  more	  specifically	  on	  RBF	  programs.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  this	  research,	  there	  was	  no	  such	  equivalent	  in	  Education.	  	  
Other	  Observations:	  	  	   Next,	  I	  addressed	  the	  research	  question	  on	  whether	  people	  and	  knowledge	  available	  about	  RBF	  is	  the	  same	  in	  both	  sectors.	  Three	  experts	  provided	  similar	  answers,	  stating	  that	  there	  were	  more	  people	  with	  experience	  and	  a	  working	  knowledge	  of	  RBF	  implementation	  in	  Health	  than	  in	  Education.	  This	  can	  be	  supported	  by	  the	  evidence	  from	  the	  case	  studies	  that	  showed	  most	  of	  the	  Health	  RBF	  schemes	  were	  implemented	  much	  earlier	  than	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  Education	  RBF	  schemes	  that	  I	  was	  able	  to	  find.	  This	  is	  also	  supported	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  through	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  HRITF,	  there	  was	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  an	  organization’s	  resources	  and	  expertise	  dedicated	  to	  RBF	  in	  Health	  and	  no	  Education	  equivalent.	  Although	  true,	  one	  expert	  said	  that	  there	  is	  currently	  a	  lot	  of	  collaboration	  between	  people	  implementing	  RBF	  in	  Health	  and	  those	  wanting	  to,	  or	  already	  using,	  RBF	  in	  Education.	  	  Beyond	  the	  research	  questions,	  I	  observed	  another	  potentially	  important	  distinction	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  both	  sectors.	  Education	  seems	  to	  be	  concentrated	  in	  the	  public	  sector,	  as	  the	  majority	  of	  children	  attend	  government	  schools	  in	  developing	  countries.	  In	  a	  1995	  report,	  the	  World	  Bank	  estimated	  that	  about	  95%	  of	  primary	  schools	  in	  low-­‐income	  countries	  were	  government	  ran	  or	  supported	  schools.83	  However,	  in	  Health,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  mix	  of	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  concentration,	  with	  many	  private	  organizations	  or	  NGOs	  running	  separate	  clinics	  within	  countries.	  According	  to	  an	  executive	  study	  by	  the	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Center	  for	  Global	  Development,	  private	  doctors	  or	  healthcare	  professionals	  provide	  more	  than	  half	  of	  all	  health	  services,	  even	  among	  the	  poor.84	  
FINDINGS	  &	  CONCLUSIONS:	  	  
	   Through	  the	  case	  study	  analysis,	  expert	  interviews,	  and	  other	  observations	  acquired	  through	  literature,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  answer	  each	  specific	  research	  question	  and	  come	  up	  with	  reasoning	  for	  what	  was	  seen	  in	  RBF	  in	  each	  sector.	  	  To	  the	  overall	  research	  question,	  which	  asked	  if	  RBF	  was	  used	  more	  in	  Health	  than	  in	  Education,	  I	  concluded	  that	  RBF	  has	  been	  more	  applied	  to	  Health	  but	  is	  becoming	  more	  of	  a	  trend	  in	  Education.	  There	  were	  also	  some	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  way	  RBF	  was	  used	  or	  implemented	  in	  each	  sector.	  This	  conclusion	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  data	  and	  observations	  acquired	  for	  each	  specific	  research	  question.	  	  	   First,	  as	  of	  2013,	  there	  is	  more	  money	  being	  given	  as	  aid	  in	  Health	  than	  in	  Education.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  very	  influential	  factor	  that	  affects	  the	  implementation	  of	  RBF	  in	  each	  sector.	  RBF	  became	  more	  popular	  in	  Health	  in	  the	  early	  2000s,	  as	  seen	  by	  the	  dates	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  and	  when	  the	  World	  Bank	  started	  their	  trust	  fund.	  This	  was	  before	  the	  decline	  of	  aid	  money	  going	  into	  Education,	  which	  started	  around	  2010,	  and	  long	  before	  2013	  when	  Health	  began	  to	  surpass	  Education	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  annual	  aid	  money	  received.	  	  	   Similarly	  to	  donor	  money,	  the	  source	  of	  the	  funding	  for	  RBF	  programs	  in	  each	  sector	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  difference	  of	  RBF	  across	  sectors.	  In	  both	  sectors,	  the	  World	  Bank	  funded	  and	  supported	  the	  implementation	  of	  RBF	  schemes	  in	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many	  of	  the	  case	  studies.	  Again,	  both	  sectors	  had	  large	  governmental	  aid	  organizations	  involved,	  USAID	  in	  Health	  and	  DFID	  in	  Education,	  potentially	  meaning	  that	  the	  money	  put	  into	  RBF	  programs	  was	  similar	  in	  both	  sectors.	  Still,	  it	  was	  clear	  by	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  HRITF	  that	  the	  World	  Bank	  has	  been	  more	  focused	  on	  RBF	  in	  Health	  than	  in	  Education.	  This	  may	  account	  for	  the	  difference	  in	  prevalence	  of	  RBF	  in	  Health	  since	  the	  World	  Bank,	  the	  organization	  most	  involved	  in	  supporting	  RBF,	  has	  seemingly	  put	  more	  resources	  into	  Health	  RBF	  programs.	  	  	   Something	  else	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  allocation	  of	  resources	  suggests	  is	  that	  there	  are	  more	  people	  with	  RBF	  experience	  and	  knowledge	  in	  Health	  than	  in	  Education.	  The	  experts	  interviewed	  for	  this	  study	  also	  supported	  this	  observation.	  Two	  experts	  agreed	  that	  there	  are	  far	  more	  people	  familiar	  with	  RBF	  in	  Health	  than	  in	  Education.	  Although	  they	  agreed	  on	  this,	  there	  was	  disagreement	  on	  how	  big	  of	  a	  limitation	  this	  was	  to	  RBF’s	  usage	  in	  Education.	  One	  expert	  believed	  the	  lack	  of	  people	  with	  RBF	  knowledge	  in	  Education	  was	  a	  large	  limitation,	  while	  the	  other	  believed	  this	  was	  not	  a	  large	  limitation	  because	  Health	  RBF	  experts	  and	  Education	  professional	  have,	  and	  continue	  to,	  collaborate.	  The	  case	  study	  analysis	  more	  strongly	  supports	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  latter	  expert.	  	  Since	  the	  World	  Bank	  was	  involved	  in	  a	  majority	  of	  RBF	  programs	  in	  both	  sectors,	  there	  is	  a	  great	  possibility	  that,	  even	  if	  different	  departments	  within	  the	  World	  Bank	  implemented	  these	  programs,	  there	  was	  a	  lot	  of	  intragroup	  collaboration.	  Additionally,	  the	  case	  studies	  revealed	  that	  even	  when	  the	  World	  Bank	  was	  not	  the	  primary	  implementer	  for	  the	  RBF	  scheme	  in	  Education,	  they	  still	  were	  cited	  as	  a	  financial	  backer	  or	  were	  consulted,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  Education	  RBF	  programs	  in	  Tanzania	  and	  India.	  Although	  the	  World	  Bank	  was	  not	  involved	  in	  DFID’s	  RBF	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programs,	  the	  two	  organizations	  mutually	  supported	  other	  programs,	  such	  as	  the	  Twaweza	  program,	  suggesting	  a	  close	  relationship	  and	  an	  exchanged	  of	  knowledge.	  	   One	  thing	  that	  seems	  to	  have	  played	  a	  large	  role	  in	  the	  implementation	  and	  structure	  of	  RBF	  programs	  in	  each	  sector	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  outputs	  translate	  into	  outcomes.	  In	  Health,	  there	  is	  a	  much	  stronger	  trend	  of	  outputs	  turning	  into	  outcomes	  than	  in	  Education.	  This	  has	  affected	  RBF	  programs	  because	  it	  influences	  the	  indicators	  and	  measurement	  systems	  picked.	  It	  also	  has	  potentially	  influenced	  the	  frequency	  at	  which	  RBF	  is	  used	  in	  each	  sector.	  Almost	  all	  the	  indicators	  chosen	  for	  Health	  RBF	  programs	  were	  output	  indicators	  that	  focused	  on	  services	  provided	  to	  women	  and	  children.	  	  Consequently,	  those	  types	  of	  indicators	  do	  not	  require	  as	  complicated	  of	  a	  measuring	  system	  because	  they	  usually	  involve	  verifying	  the	  amount	  of	  services	  provided	  by	  each	  organization.	  Less	  complicated	  measurement,	  along	  with	  there	  being	  little	  debate	  over	  whether	  these	  measurements	  could	  negatively	  impact	  the	  care	  of	  patients	  could	  be	  a	  reason	  RBF	  was	  seen	  more	  in	  the	  Health	  sector.	  	  In	  Education,	  however,	  almost	  all	  the	  indicators	  were	  outcome-­‐based,	  focused	  on	  learning	  achievement,	  because	  of	  the	  poor	  relationship	  between	  outputs	  and	  outcomes.	  The	  fact	  that	  these	  types	  of	  indicators	  seem	  necessary	  in	  Education	  might	  also	  be	  a	  part	  of	  the	  reason	  why	  RBF	  has	  been	  implemented	  much	  later	  in	  Education	  than	  in	  Health.	  In	  an	  interview,	  an	  expert	  claimed	  that	  people	  within	  the	  Education	  sector	  have	  been	  much	  more	  hesitant	  to	  measuring	  outcomes	  because	  of	  the	  potential	  drawbacks	  it	  could	  have,	  such	  as	  teaching	  to	  the	  test.	  This	  resistance	  and	  then	  gradual	  shift	  towards	  measuring	  learning	  outcomes	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  number	  of	  developing	  countries	  who	  use	  national	  testing.	  As	  of	  1998,	  only	  28%	  of	  developing	  countries	  administered	  a	  national	  standardized	  test,	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whereas	  in	  2006,	  51%	  of	  developing	  countries	  had	  started	  administering	  standardized	  tests.85	  With	  movements	  to	  measure	  learning	  outcomes	  being	  newer	  phenomena,	  it	  makes	  sense	  that	  implementing	  RBF,	  which	  requires	  these	  measurements,	  would	  not	  have	  been	  popular	  with	  Education	  professionals	  in	  previous	  years.	  	  Additionally,	  an	  expert	  identified	  that	  another	  potential	  initial	  barrier	  to	  RBF’s	  implementation	  in	  Education	  has	  been	  the	  time	  and	  resources	  needed	  to	  create	  quality	  examinations	  for	  the	  measurement	  of	  learning	  achievement.	  Although	  this	  may	  have	  created	  an	  initial	  barrier,	  the	  expert	  also	  stated	  that	  spending	  money	  on	  creating	  quality	  tests	  it	  is	  not	  a	  large	  enough	  limitation	  to	  account	  for	  less	  RBF	  in	  Education	  than	  in	  Health.	  The	  expert	  believed	  the	  real	  reason	  is	  because	  Education	  refused	  to	  be	  measured	  for	  a	  lot	  longer	  than	  Health	  did.	  	  	   This	  expert’s	  opinion	  and	  observation	  can	  be	  supported	  further	  by	  evidence	  that	  suggests	  the	  push	  to	  measure	  Education	  and	  create	  learning	  assessments	  happened	  independently	  of	  RBF’s	  appearance	  in	  Education.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Education	  sector	  was	  not	  waiting	  for	  the	  completion	  of	  quality	  tests	  to	  be	  made	  in	  order	  to	  implement	  RBF.	  NGOs,	  such	  as	  Twaweza	  and	  ASER,	  have	  made	  tests	  to	  measure	  literacy,	  numeracy,	  and	  other	  skills	  for	  their	  own	  research	  on	  learning	  achievement	  in	  different	  countries	  around	  the	  world.	  These	  learning	  assessments	  had	  no	  connection	  to	  RBF	  schemes	  initially.	  Later	  on,	  however,	  as	  RBF	  programs	  were	  being	  designed	  in	  Education,	  these	  tests	  were	  used	  as	  measurements	  tools.	  The	  case	  studies	  taking	  place	  in	  Tanzania	  and	  India	  are	  examples	  of	  RBF	  schemes	  that	  used	  assessments	  created	  by	  NGOs.	  Also,	  the	  RBF	  programs	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  Marlaine	  Lockheed.	  "Measuring	  Progress	  with	  Tests	  of	  Learning:	  Pros	  and	  Cons	  for'Cash	  on	  Delivery	  Aid'in	  Education."	  Center	  for	  Global	  Development	  Working	  Paper	  147	  (2008),	  2.	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implemented	  by	  DFID	  in	  Rwanda	  and	  Ethiopia	  used	  already	  existing	  government	  standardized	  tests.	  This	  evidence	  shows	  that	  creating	  tests	  for	  measuring	  RBF	  schemes	  does	  not	  play	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  the	  current	  frequency	  of	  RBF	  usage	  in	  Education.	  	  Beside	  the	  dates	  of	  the	  case	  studies,	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  of	  the	  Education	  cases	  were	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  randomized	  control	  trial,	  while	  none	  were	  in	  Health,	  further	  supports	  that	  RBF	  is	  newer	  in	  Education.	  	  The	  randomized	  control	  trials	  seen	  in	  the	  Education	  case	  studies	  focused	  on	  understanding	  where	  to	  target	  incentives	  in	  order	  to	  most	  effectively	  achieve	  learning	  outcomes.	  The	  fact	  that	  professionals	  are	  still	  trying	  to	  figure	  out	  how	  RBF	  can	  be	  most	  successful	  in	  Education	  reveals	  two	  things:	  1)	  getting	  to	  outcomes	  in	  Education	  is	  much	  more	  difficult	  than	  in	  Health	  and	  2)	  RBF	  is	  much	  newer	  in	  Education.	  However,	  there	  is	  also	  the	  possibility	  that	  this	  observation	  was	  only	  seen	  because	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  chosen.	  That	  said	  the	  Education	  case	  studies	  used	  for	  this	  research	  were	  the	  only	  ones	  I	  could	  find,	  even	  more	  so	  supporting	  that	  RBF	  is	  newer	  and	  used	  less	  in	  Education.	  	  These	  randomized	  control	  trials	  also	  show	  that	  the	  Education	  sector	  is	  attempting	  to	  not	  let	  the	  difficulty	  of	  measuring	  and	  achieving	  educational	  outcomes	  be	  a	  large	  limitation	  to	  implementing	  RBF.	  Even	  so,	  the	  lack	  of	  data	  thus	  far	  regarding	  the	  most	  effective	  ways	  to	  use	  RBF	  in	  Education	  could	  be	  influencing	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  donors	  and	  organizations	  are	  choosing	  to	  use	  RBF	  programs.	  However,	  as	  more	  data	  is	  collected	  through	  these	  pilot	  programs,	  it	  seems	  that	  this	  limitation	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  less	  of	  a	  barrier	  to	  using	  RBF	  in	  Education.	  	  Another	  factor	  that	  affects	  the	  way	  in	  which	  RBF	  is	  implemented,	  but	  not	  the	  frequency	  of	  use,	  is	  the	  structure	  of	  each	  sector.	  All	  of	  the	  Education	  case	  studies	  had	  an	  intervention	  level	  that	  was	  connected	  to	  the	  country’s	  government,	  as	  even	  the	  recipients	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of	  individual-­‐based	  incentive	  being	  government	  teachers.	  In	  the	  Health	  cases,	  the	  intervention	  levels	  were	  mixed	  between	  private	  and	  public.	  Some	  were	  focused	  on	  paying	  to	  a	  government,	  while	  the	  majority	  focused	  on	  paying	  out	  to	  NGOs.	  As	  stated	  in	  the	  Observations	  chapter,	  public	  education	  is	  used	  by	  a	  large	  majority	  of	  families	  in	  developing	  countries.	  In	  Health,	  there	  is	  almost	  a	  50-­‐50	  split	  in	  the	  use	  of	  public	  and	  private	  health	  services	  in	  developing	  countries.	  This	  accounts	  for	  the	  differences	  in	  intervention	  level	  seen	  across	  the	  Education	  and	  Health	  case	  studies.	  In	  conclusion,	  RBF	  is	  used	  at	  different	  frequencies	  and	  in	  different	  ways	  in	  Health	  and	  Education.	  RBF,	  at	  this	  point	  in	  time,	  is	  seen	  much	  more	  in	  Health	  than	  in	  Education.	  Some	  potential	  limitations	  that	  have	  affected	  the	  frequency	  of	  RBF	  usage	  in	  Education	  are	  the	  lack	  of	  people	  with	  RBF	  experience,	  the	  money	  available	  for	  RBF,	  and	  the	  weaker	  relationship	  between	  outputs	  and	  outcomes.	  It	  does	  not	  seem	  that	  any	  of	  these	  limitations	  is	  large	  enough	  to	  fully	  explain	  why	  RBF	  is	  seen	  less	  in	  Education	  because	  there	  seem	  to	  be	  similar	  RBF-­‐promoting	  organizations	  present	  in	  both	  sectors,	  there	  is	  exchange	  of	  ideas	  and	  assistance	  across	  sectors,	  and	  Education	  is	  researching	  the	  best	  ways	  to	  achieve	  learning	  outcomes.	  In	  conjunction	  with	  expert	  opinion,	  it	  seems	  much	  more	  likely	  that	  RBF	  is	  currently	  seen	  less	  in	  Education	  than	  in	  Health	  because	  it	  is	  newer	  due	  to	  Education’s	  resistance	  to	  measuring	  learning	  outcomes.	  Ultimately,	  I	  predict	  that	  over	  time	  these	  results	  will	  change	  and	  that	  RBF	  will	  be	  used	  more	  in	  Education	  as	  these	  pilot	  programs	  and	  randomized	  control	  trials	  start	  to	  publish	  promising	  results.	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FUTURE	  RESEARCH	  &	  DIRECTIONS:	  	  My	  findings	  thus	  far	  have	  answered	  some	  questions	  of	  the	  differences	  of	  RBF	  in	  Education	  and	  Health;	  however,	  my	  findings	  also	  have	  led	  to	  more	  questions.	  With	  more	  time	  and	  resources,	  there	  would	  be	  several	  areas	  I	  would	  continue	  to	  explore.	  One	  observation	  I	  had	  while	  doing	  my	  research	  was	  that	  many	  of	  the	  RBF	  schemes	  in	  Latin	  America,	  especially	  ones	  in	  Education,	  were	  focused	  on	  demand-­‐side	  instead	  of	  supply-­‐side	  incentives.	  Constrained	  by	  time	  and	  other	  aspects	  of	  my	  research,	  I	  was	  not	  able	  to	  investigate	  this	  further.	  However,	  with	  more	  time,	  I	  would	  be	  interested	  in	  learning	  the	  reasons	  behind	  this	  observation.	  To	  help	  explain	  this	  phenomenon,	  I	  would	  try	  to	  find	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  Health	  and	  Education	  sectors	  in	  Latin	  America	  differ	  from	  other	  developing	  regions.	  I	  would	  search	  for	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  privatization	  of	  Education	  in	  Latin	  America	  versus	  other	  developing	  regions	  to	  see	  if	  that	  plays	  a	  role.	  I	  would	  also	  look	  into	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  people	  in	  Latin	  America	  are	  trying	  to	  solve	  issues	  of	  low	  learning	  achievement.	  Perhaps	  their	  solution	  entails	  sending	  more	  children	  to	  private	  schools,	  and	  helping	  families	  financially	  to	  be	  able	  to	  afford	  private	  school	  through	  RBF	  schemes	  would	  be	  a	  logical	  means	  to	  that	  solution.	  I	  would	  also	  see	  if	  the	  organizations	  implementing	  RBF	  in	  Latin	  America	  differed	  from	  the	  organizations	  in	  my	  case	  study	  analysis	  that	  seemed	  to	  support	  supply-­‐side	  RBF	  schemes.	  If	  the	  organizations	  were	  different,	  the	  difference	  in	  RBF	  schemes	  being	  used	  could	  be	  based	  on	  the	  preference	  of	  those	  organizations.	  Exploring	  this	  possibility	  more	  would	  ultimately	  give	  more	  insight	  to	  the	  differences	  of	  RBF	  in	  Education	  and	  Health	  and	  even	  the	  difference	  of	  its	  use	  within	  each	  sector.	  	  	   To	  better	  support	  my	  prediction	  that	  RBF	  usage	  in	  Education	  will	  continue	  to	  increase,	  I	  would	  want	  to	  continue	  my	  study	  and	  observations	  over	  a	  longer	  period	  of	  time.	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An	  analysis	  of	  RBF’s	  use	  within	  Education	  over	  time	  would	  give	  more	  support	  for,	  or	  potentially	  against,	  my	  finding	  that	  RBF	  is	  less	  used	  in	  Education	  because	  it	  is	  newer	  in	  the	  sector.	  If	  this	  were	  the	  case,	  then	  it	  would	  be	  expected	  that	  RBF	  would	  continue	  to	  gain	  popularity	  and	  usage	  in	  Education	  as	  it	  becomes	  more	  established.	  Looking	  at	  the	  use	  of	  RBF	  in	  Education	  over	  the	  next	  several	  years	  would	  also	  show	  if	  RBF	  is	  as	  successful	  in	  Education	  as	  in	  Health	  and	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  that.	  Time	  could	  also	  show	  that	  my	  analysis	  of	  limitations	  to	  RBF	  in	  Education	  was	  correct	  or	  it	  could	  show	  that	  things	  I	  thought	  were	  small	  limitations	  ended	  up	  playing	  a	  much	  larger	  role	  in	  RBF’s	  implementation	  into	  Education.	  Continuing	  my	  study	  would	  also	  allow	  me	  to	  incorporate	  more	  research	  on	  which	  intervention	  levels	  work	  best	  for	  Education	  that	  will	  presumably	  be	  published	  in	  upcoming	  years	  as	  some	  of	  the	  RBF	  Education	  pilot	  programs	  end.	  	  After	  concluding	  my	  research	  project,	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  Education	  Trust	  Fund	  by	  the	  World	  Bank,	  similar	  to	  HRITF,	  was	  announced.	  If	  the	  research	  project	  were	  to	  continue	  into	  the	  coming	  years,	  I	  would	  investigate	  how	  the	  establishment	  of	  this	  trust	  fund	  affects	  the	  use	  and	  implementation	  of	  RBF	  in	  Education.	  Assuming	  that	  this	  trust	  fund	  will	  be	  dedicated	  to	  RBF	  schemes,	  its	  launch	  means	  more	  money,	  people,	  and	  expertise	  will	  be	  entering	  into	  RBF	  in	  Education.	  Studying	  this	  trust	  fund’s	  impact	  on	  RBF	  in	  Education	  would	  allow	  for	  more	  insight	  on	  the	  influence	  money	  and	  RBF	  knowledge	  has	  on	  the	  frequency	  of	  RBF	  usage	  in	  a	  sector.	  It	  would	  also	  be	  interesting	  to	  see	  how	  this	  new	  group	  will	  influence	  the	  amount	  material	  published	  on	  using	  RBF	  more	  effectively	  to	  achieve	  learning	  outcomes	  and	  how	  drastically	  the	  new	  research	  changes	  the	  RBF	  seen	  in	  the	  Education	  case	  studies	  presented	  in	  this	  study.	  Overall,	  my	  analysis	  would	  be	  enhanced	  by	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a	  more	  long-­‐term	  study	  that	  monitors	  how	  RBF	  in	  Education	  continues	  to	  change	  and	  if	  those	  changes	  affect	  RBF	  in	  Health	  as	  well.	  	  
REFERENCES:	  	  Alesina,	  Alberto,	  and	  David	  Dollar.	  "Who	  gives	  foreign	  aid	  to	  whom	  and	  why?"	  Journal	  of
	   economic	  growth	  5,	  no.	  1	  (2000),	  33-­‐63.	  	  "ASER	  Centre."	  Accessed	  March	  8,	  2015.	  http://www.asercentre.org/.	  	  Azam,	  Mehtabul,	  and	  Geeta	  Gandhi	  Kingdon.	  "Assessing	  Teacher	  Quality	  in	  India."	  Available
	   at	  SSRN	  (2014).	  	  Barro,	  Robert	  J.	  "Education	  and	  economic	  growth."	  The	  contribution	  of	  human	  and	  social
	   capital	  to	  sustained	  economic	  growth	  and	  well-­‐being	  (2001),	  13-­‐41.	  	  Birdsall,	  Nancy	  and	  Rita	  Perakis.“Cash	  on	  Delivery	  Aid:	  Implementation	  of	  a	  Pilot	  in	   Ethiopia.”Note.	  Washington,	  DC:	  CGD	  (2012).	  	  
	  Birdsall,	  Nancy,	  William	  D.	  Savedoff,	  Ayah	  Mahgoub,	  and	  Katherine	  Vyborny.Cash	  on
	   delivery:	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  foreign	  aid.	  CGD	  Books,	  2010.	  
	  Bloom,	  David	  E.,	  David	  Canning,	  and	  Dean	  T.	  Jamison.	  "Health,	  wealth,	  and	  welfare."	  Finance
	   and	  development	  41	  (2004),	  10-­‐15.	  	  De	  Renzio,	  Paolo,	  and	  Nagaire	  Woods.	  "The	  Trouble	  with	  Cash	  on	  Delivery	  Aid:	  A	  note	  on	  its	   potential	  effects	  on	  recipient	  country	  institutions."	  Note	  prepared	  for	  CGD	  initiative
	   on	  cash	  on	  delivery	  (2008).	  	  "Education	  and	  the	  Developing	  World."	  Center	  For	  Global	  Development.	  June	  12,	  2006.	   Accessed	  March	  8,	  2015.	  http://www.cgdev.org/files/2844_file_EDUCATON1.pdf.	  	  Eichler,	  Rena,	  and	  Ruth	  Levine,	  eds.	  Performance	  incentives	  for	  global	  health:	  potential	  and	  
pitfalls.	  CGD	  Books,	  2009.	  	  Chandramouli,	  C.	  "Chapter	  6:	  State	  of	  Literacy."	  In	  Provisional	  Population	  Totals	  Paper	  1	  of
	   2011	  India	  Series	  1.	  India:	  Registrar	  General	  and	  Census	  Commissioner	  of	  India,	   2011.	  	  Eichler,	  Rena,	  Paul	  Auxila,	  Uder	  Antoine,	  and	  Bernateau	  Desmangles.	  "Haiti:	  going	  to	  scale	  	   with	  a	  performance	  incentive	  model."	  Eichler	  R,	  Levine	  R;	  the	  Performance-­‐based
	   Incentives	  Working	  Group.	  Performance	  incentives	  for	  global	  health:	  potential	  and
	   pitfalls.	  Washington,	  DC:	  Center	  for	  Global	  Development	  (2009),	  165-­‐188.	  	  
Taliaferro	  60	  	  
	  
Gertler,	  Paul	  J.,	  and	  Paula	  Ines	  Giovagnoli.	  "Rewarding	  provider	  performance	  to	  enable	  a	   healthy	  start	  to	  life:	  evidence	  from	  Argentina's	  Plan	  Nacer."	  World	  Bank	  Policy
	   Research	  Working	  Paper	  6884	  (2014).	  	  Glewwe,	  Paul,	  and	  Michael	  Kremer.	  "Schools,	  teachers,	  and	  education	  outcomes	  in	   developing	  countries."	  Handbook	  of	  the	  Economics	  of	  Education	  2	  (2006),	  945-­‐1017.	  	  Glewwe,	  Paul,	  Nauman	  Ilias,	  and	  Michael	  Kremer.	  Teacher	  incentives.	  No.	  w9671.	  National	   Bureau	  of	  Economic	  Research,	  2003.	  Accessed	  March	  9,	  2015.	   https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.2.3.205.	  	  “GNI	  per	  Capita,	  Atlas	  Method	  (current	  US$)."	  The	  World	  Bank.	  Accessed	  March	  9,	  2015.	   http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD/countries/XM	   XD?display=graph.	  	  Grittner,	  Amanda	  Melina.	  "Results-­‐based	  Financing."	  Bonn,	  Germany:	  	  German	   Development	  Institute	  (2013),	  	  Harding,	  April.	  "Partnerships	  with	  the	  Private	  Sector	  in	  Health."	  Washington,	  DC:	  CGD	   (2009).	  	  "Incidence	  of	  Tuberculosis	  (per	  100,000	  People)."	  The	  World	  Bank.	  Accessed	  March	  10,	   2015.	  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.TBS.INCD/countries/XM	   XD?display=graph.	  	  Krueger,	  Alan	  B.,	  and	  Jitka	  Malečková.	  "Education,	  poverty	  and	  terrorism:	  Is	  there	  a	  causal	   connection?."	  The	  Journal	  of	  Economic	  Perspectives	  17,	  no.	  4	  (2003),	  119-­‐144.	  	  "Life	  Expectancy	  at	  Birth,	  Total	  (years)."	  The	  World	  Bank.	  Accessed	  March	  10,	  2015.	   http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN/countries/XM	   XD?display=graph.	  	  "Literacy	  Rate,	  Youth	  Total	  (%	  of	  People	  Ages	  15-­‐24)."	  The	  World	  Bank.	  Accessed	  March	  9,	   2015.	  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.1524.LT.ZS/countries/1W-­‐XM	   ZF?display=graph.	  	  Lockheed,	  Marlaine.	  "Measuring	  Progress	  with	  Tests	  of	  Learning:	  Pros	  and	  Cons	  for	  'Cash	   on	  Delivery	  Aid'	  in	  Education."	  Center	  for	  Global	  Development	  Working	  Paper	  147	   (2008).	  	  Maizels,	  Alfred,	  and	  Machiko	  K.	  Nissanke.	  "Motivations	  for	  aid	  to	  developing	   countries."	  World	  Development	  12,	  no.	  9	  (1984),	  879-­‐900.	  	  "Millennium	  Development	  Goals	  Report	  2014."	  New	  York	  City,	  NY:	  United	  Nations	  (2014).	   Accessed	  March	  8,	  2015.	  http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2014	  MDG	   report/MDG	  2014	  English	  web.pdf.	  
Taliaferro	  61	  	  
	  
	  Karthik	  Muralidharan.	  “Long-­‐term	  Effects	  of	  Teacher	  Performance	  Pay:	  Experimental	   Evidence	  from	  India.”	  Society	  for	  Research	  on	  Educational	  Effectiveness	  (2012),	  1-­‐43.	  	  Muralidharan,	  Karthik,	  and	  Venkatesh	  Sundararaman.	  Teacher	  performance	  pay:
	   Experimental	  evidence	  from	  India.	  No.	  w15323.	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	   Research,	  2009,	  39-­‐77.	  	  "OECD	  Statistics."	  OECD.	  Accessed	  March	  9,	  2015.	  http://stats.oecd.org/#.	  	  Oxman,	  Andy	  D.,	  and	  Atle	  Fretheim.	  "An	  overview	  of	  research	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  results	   based	  financing."	  (2008).	  	  Oxman,	  Andrew	  D.,	  and	  Atle	  Fretheim.	  "Can	  paying	  for	  results	  help	  to	  achieve	  the	   Millennium	  Development	  Goals?	  Overview	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  results-­‐based	   financing."	  Journal	  of	  Evidence-­‐Based	  Medicine	  2,	  no.	  2	  (2009):	  70-­‐83.	  	  Pearson,	  Mark,	  Martin	  Johnson,	  and	  Robin	  Ellison.	  "Review	  of	  major	  Results	  Based	  Aid	   (RBA)	  and	  Results	  Based	  Financing	  (RBF)	  schemes."	  Final	  report.	  DfID	  Human
	   Development	  Resource	  Centre	  (2010).	  	  Perakis,	  Rita,	  and	  William	  D.	  Savedoff.	  "An	  Introduction	  to	  Cash	  on	  Delivery	  Aid	  for	   Funders."	  Note.	  Washington,	  DC:	  CGD	  (2014).	  	  Perakis,	  Rita,	  and	  William	  D.	  Savedoff.	  "Does	  Results-­‐Based	  Aid	  Change	  Anything?	   Pecuniary	  Interests,	  Attention,	  Accountability	  and	  Discretion	  in	  Four	  Case	  Studies."	   (2015).	  	  "Primary	  Completion	  Rate,	  Total	  (%	  of	  Relevant	  Age	  Group)."	  The	  World	  Bank.	  January	  1,	   2012.	  Accessed	  March	  8,	  2015.	   http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.CMPT.ZS/countries/1W	   XM?display=default.	  	  Radelet,	  Steven.	  "A	  Primer	  on	  Foreign	  Aid."	  Centre	  For	  Global	  Development.	  July	  1,	  2006.	   Accessed	  March	  8,	  2015.	  http://www.cgdev.org/files/8846_file_WP92.pdf.	  	  Regalia,	  Ferdinando,	  and	  Leslie	  Castro.	  "Nicaragua:	  Combining	  Demand-­‐and	  Supply-­‐Side	   Incentives."	  Eichler	  R,	  Levine	  R,	  the	  Performance-­‐Based	  Incentives	  Working	  Group.
	   Performance	  incentives	  for	  global	  health:	  potential	  and	  pitfalls.	  Washington,	  DC:
	   Center	  for	  Global	  Development	  (2009),	  215-­‐235.	  	  Rusa,	  Louis,	  Miriam	  Schneidman,	  Gyuri	  Fritsche,	  and	  Laurent	  Musango.	  "Rwanda:	   Performance-­‐based	  financing	  in	  the	  public	  sector."	  Performance	  incentives	  for	  global
	   health:	  potential	  and	  pitfalls	  (2009).	  	  “Rwanda	  Education	  Programme	  2011/12	  to	  2014/15	  Business	  Case.”	  England:	  UKaid	  from	   the	  Development	  for	  International	  Development.	  	  
Taliaferro	  62	  	  
	  
	  Savedoff,	  William	  D.	  "Incentive	  proliferation?	  Making	  sense	  of	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  development	   programs."	  (2011).	  
 Savedoff,	  William	  D.,	  and	  Katherine	  Douglas	  Martel.	  "Cash	  on	  delivery	  aid	  for	  health:	  What	   indicators	  would	  work	  best?."	  Center	  for	  Global	  Development	  Working	  Paper	  275	   (2011).	  	  “School	  Enrollment,	  Secondary	  (%	  Gross)."	  The	  World	  Bank.	  January	  1,	  2012.	  Accessed	   March	  8,	  2015.	   http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR/countries/1WXM	   ZF%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20US?display=default	  	  Seear,	  Michael.	  "Chapter	  2:	  A	  History	  of	  Foreign	  Aid."	  In	  An	  Introduction	  to	  International
	   Health.	  Toronto:	  Canadian	  Scholars'	  Press,	  2007.	  	  Sondorp,	  Egbert,	  Natasha	  Palmer,	  Lesley	  Strong,	  and	  Abdul	  Wali.	  "Afghanistan:	  Paying	   NGOs	  for	  performance	  in	  a	  postconflict	  setting."	  Eichler	  R,	  Levine	  R;	  the	  Performance
	   Based	  Incentives	  Working	  Group.	  Performance	  incentives	  for	  global	  health:	  potential
	   and	  pitfalls.	  Washington,	  DC:	  Center	  for	  Global	  Development	  (2009),	  139-­‐164.	  	  "Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  the	  Right	  to	  Education."	  United	  Nations	  Human	  Rights.	  Accessed	   March	  8,	  2015.	   http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Education/SREducation/Pages/SREducationIn	   ex.aspx.	  	  "Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  the	  Right	  to	  Health."	  United	  Nations	  Human	  Rights.	  Accessed	  March	   8,	  2015.	  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Health/Pages/SRRightHealthIndex.aspx.	  	  "Three	  Experiments	  to	  Improve	  Learning	  Outcomes	  in	  Tanzania:	  Delivering	  capitation	   grants	  better	  and	  testing	  local	  cash	  on	  delivery."	  Note.	  Tanzania:	  Twaweza	  (2012).	  	  	  “Trends	  Over	  Time	  2006-­‐2014.”	  New	  Delhi,	  India:	  ASER	  Centre	  (2015).	  	  Vyborny,	  Katherine.	  "Cash	  on	  delivery	  aid	  for	  education:	  experiences	  of	  incentive-­‐based	   approaches."	  Center	  for	  Global	  Development.	  Available	  from:	  http://www.	  cgdev.





	   	  
Taliaferro	  63	  	  
	  
APPENDICES:	  	  
Appendix	  A:	  Interview	  Guide	  	  Below	  is	  the	  oral	  script	  used	  and	  questions	  asked	  during	  expert	  interviews.	  Not	  all	  questions	  were	  asked	  to	  each	  interviewee,	  as	  some	  pertained	  to	  their	  field	  of	  expertise	  more	  than	  others.	  	  
Oral	  Script:	  	  Hi,	  my	  name	  is	  Paige	  Taliaferro;	  I	  am	  a	  student	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Michigan	  doing	  research	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  impact	  of	  Result-­‐Based	  Financing	  in	  the	  Health	  and	  Education	  sectors.	  I	  have	  been	  referred	  to	  you	  by	  __________	  because	  you	  are	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  implementation	  for	  RBF.	  Would	  you	  be	  willing	  to	  let	  me	  interview	  you	  for	  more	  information	  about	  RBF	  and	  your	  opinion	  on	  it?	  The	  information	  you	  provide	  me	  will	  be	  used	  as	  a	  part	  of	  my	  research	  analysis,	  but	  your	  identity	  will	  be	  kept	  anonymous.	  	  
Questions:	  	  
• What	  are	  the	  organizations/governments	  involved	  in	  RBF	  funding?	  
• When	  did	  RBF	  first	  start	  being	  used?	  	  
o Did	  that	  vary	  across	  sectors?	  Why?	  
• What	  is	  necessary	  for	  a	  successful	  RBF	  program?	  
• Has	  RBF	  fallen	  short	  of	  your	  expectations?	  	  
• What	  ways	  can	  RBF	  be	  improved?	  In	  Education?	  In	  Health?	  
• What	  are	  the	  limitations	  of	  RBF?	  In	  Health?	  In	  Education?	  
• What	  are	  the	  implementation	  challenges	  of	  RBF	  in	  both	  sectors?	  
• What	  is	  the	  general	  reaction	  of	  those	  on	  the	  receiving	  end	  of	  this	  new	  aid	  method?	  
• What	  do	  you	  see	  as	  the	  future	  of	  Result-­‐based	  Financing?	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• In	  your	  opinion,	  is	  it	  only	  appropriate	  to	  use	  this	  method	  in	  the	  context	  of	  developing	  countries?	  
• How	  have	  people	  chosen	  to	  measure	  improvement	  in	  Health?	  Why	  these	  ways?	  
• Is	  RBF	  used	  more	  in	  Health?	  If	  so,	  why?	  
o Is	  RBF	  more	  fit	  or	  necessary	  in	  a	  certain	  sector?	  
• Is	  there	  more	  money	  in	  Health	  versus	  Education?	  
• What	  are	  some	  current	  Education	  RBF	  schemes	  you	  are	  aware	  of?	  
• What	  is	  the	  most	  successful	  method	  to	  evaluate	  learning	  and	  why?	  	  
• Is	  measuring	  Education	  harder	  than	  measuring	  Health?	  	  
o Does	  that	  impact	  RBF	  usage?	  
• In	  your	  opinion,	  does	  result-­‐based	  financing	  schemes	  work	  with	  the	  unique	  outputs	  and	  evaluation	  methods	  used	  in	  education?	  
o If	  so,	  what	  type	  of	  result-­‐based	  financing	  schemes	  work	  best	  in	  education	  and	  why?	  
• Do	  you	  have	  any	  suggestions	  of	  literature	  I	  should	  be	  looking	  at?	  
